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I. (§1) NATURE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to bring together within the confines of a 
single article a survey of the various problems which have arisen in the field 
of conflict of laws, both in this country and abroad, as to whether the forum 
*[Professor of Law, University of Southern California.] 
The author is indebted to Mr. Frederick F. Barker, of the Los Angeles Bar, for 
careful reading of the manuscript and many suggestions as to form. 
1For convenience in future reference, each subdivision of the table of contents, 
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should follow its own-choice of a conflict-of-laws principle, or should apply 
a conflict-of-laws principle selected for it by some other jurisdiction. The 
"forum", it should be explained, is the term used in this field to designate 
either the court or the jurisdiction in which litigation is pending, and where 
any particular case must, therefore, be decided, as distinguished from other 
jurisdictions having some relation to the facts of the case. Obviously, more 
than one jurisdiction must be involved in some manner in order to have a 
conflict-of-laws problem. The four topics set forth in the title will serve as 
a check list to remind the student of conflict of laws of the various ap-
proaches to these problems which have been developed. The topic men-
tioned last, the "preliminary question," is believed to be illusory, as will be 
seen,2 but needs to be brought to the attention of one who would be fully 
cognizant of developments of thought in the field. 
To give at· the outset an illustration of the nature of the problems in-
volved, let us suppose that a court of the forum, jurisdiction A, is required 
to pass upon the validity of a contract executed in jurisdiction B, and to be 
performed in jurisdiction C. It is the conflict-of-laws rule of jurisdiction A 
that the validity of a contract is to be determined by the domestic law of 
the jurisdiction in which it is executed (in this instance, jurisdiction B), 
but it is the rule of jurisdiction B that all matters relating to a contract are 
to be determined by the law of the jurisdiction in which it is to be 
performed (in this instance, jurisdiction C). Shall the forum follow 
its own rule, and apply the domestic law of jurisdiction B to determine the 
validity of the contract, or shall it follow the conflict-of-laws rule of juris-
diction B, and determine the validity of the contract in accordance with the 
domestic law of jurisdiction C? This is one aspect of what is known as the 
renvoi problem.3 By domestic law is meant the body of principles applied by 
the courts of a jurisdiction when all the facts are local to, that is occurred 
within, that jurisdiction. An example of this is when a court there situated 
is passing upon a contract made within that jurisdiction and to be performed 
within it, all parties involved being local citizens. In the renvoi problem stated, 
in regard to jurisdictions A, B and C, it may be said that the American rule4 
is for the forum to follow its own conflict-of-laws rule, and therefore apply 
the domestic law of jurisdiction B, the place of execution, to determine the 
validity of the contract. This is called rejection of the renvoi doctrine, the 
doctrine being that the forum should follow the conflict-of-laws rule of 
whatever jurisdiction is looked to by the forum as governing the problem 
as set forth here and in headings throughout the article, which refers to text material 
without further subdivision, will be indicated by a section number. 
2See §5, infra. 
3See §6, infra. 
4See §8, infra. Later discussion in the text will develop that there is dissent 
from the suggestion that it is possible to state any general American rule. Cf. Gris-
wold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165 (1938). Exceptions to the American 
rule outlined in the text will be discussed in §§9-14, infra. ' 
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before it. In countries having the general rule of rejection, matters of 
property and status are treated as exceptions. 5 
The questions which will be discussed are in a part of the law which 
is still in an unsettled and formative state. Cases in which courts have 
been conscious of the existence of such problems are very few in number, 
and are illustrative rather than decisive as to the state of the law. As more 
principles are worked out definitely in the field of conflict of laws in general, 
so that a judge is more often able to ascertain what are the conflict-of-laws 
principles of other jurisdictions, the importance of these questions will 
increase. As long as a judge confronted with a conflict-of-laws problem is 
unable to ascertain what are the relevant principles of other jurisdictions, 
it is obviously a purely theoretical question whether he purports to be 
applying the conflict-of-laws principles of those jurisdictions or of his own. 
Consideration of the problems discussed in this paper before there are many 
decisions upon them may serve as an influence toward preventing the rendi-
tion of a mass of confused and contradictory holdings. 
II. CHARACTERIZATION 
1. (§2) PRIMARY CHARACTERIZATION 
Considerable ground-clearing, in the form of consideration of other 
problems, 6 will be indulged in before taking up in detail the renvoi problem 
given as an illustration in the preceding section. The renvoi problem, being 
much the most complicated in all its ramifications, as well as the most 
important, can advantageously be considered last. In general, the problems 
will be discussed in the order in which they appear chronologically in the 
consideration of a case. 
The problem which thus arises first7 is that of characterization,8 also 
referred to as "qualification",9 as in the Restatement10 and generally abroad, 
or "classification."11 It may be defined as the determination of the nature 
IiSee infra, §§9-13; see, also, infra, §14. 
6Strictly speaking, these problems are special variations of the renvoi problem, 
using that term in the sense of any problem of use by the forum of foreign conflict-
of-laws principles. 
7Falconbridge, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Law Quar.Rev. 235, 
236 (1937) ; Robertson, The ~Preliminary Question' in the Conflict of Laws, 55 Law 
Quar.Rev. 565 (1939). 
BRobertson, in his book which the present writer believes is destined to be very 
influential in connection with this problem, "feels that 'characterization' is, on the 
whole, the most appropriate term, as being more nearly used in this context in the 
same sense as in ordinary speech." Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of 
Laws (1940), 24. 
9This is the term generally employed upon the Continent. 1 Beale, Conflict of 
Laws (1935), 55, §72; Beale, The Conflict of Laws, 1886-1936, 50 Harv.L.Rev. 887, 
890 (1937); Falconbridge, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Law Quar.Rev. 
235, 239 (1937) ; Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws, 
20 Col.L.Rev. 247, 249 (1920) ; Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Delimitation of Right and 
Remedy in the Cases of Conflict of Law, 16 Brit. Y.B.Int.Law 20 at footnote #1 
(1935). 
lORestatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), §7, Comment (b). 
llBeckett, The Question of Classification ("Qualification") in Private Interna-
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of the problem12 presented to the court for solution, as the first step in 
deciding what conflict of laws principle shall be selected to govern it.18 In 
the Restatement of Conflict of Laws it -is defined as the determination of 
"the quality and character of legal ideas.''14 To illustrate, if characterized 
as a contract case, the forum may desire to apply the law of the place where 
the contract was to be performed ; if characterized as a tort case, the forum 
normally will apply the law of the place where the tort occurred. As a 
general principle, it seems to be universally agreed in this country, with 
foreign opinion largely in accord, that the forum is to perform the process 
of characterization in accordance with its own views-that is, the forum 
will not inquire whether or not the problem is similarly characterized by the 
jurisdiction to which the forum looks as the result of its own determination 
of the character of the problem.15 Certain suggested exceptions will be 
discussed later in this section. 
tiona! Law, 15 Brit.Y.B.Int.Law 46 (1934); Unger, The Place of Classification in 
Private International Law, 19 Bell Yard 3, 17-21 (1937). 
12While, for convenience, the discussion in the text is in the singular, it is not 
meant to be inferred that a case may not involV'e more than one problem requiring 
characterization. Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 135. 
18Robertson speaks of characterization as "allocation of 'the factual situation' or 
'the question' to its correct legal category." Characterization in the Conflict of Laws 
(1940), 66. He also says: "The function of primary characterization is to put upon 
the facts a legal complexion, or allot them to a legal category, which will have a 
choice of law rule available for the disposition of the case." Ibid. 61. He likes 
Unger's "subsumption of facts under categories of law." Ibid. 62, citing Unger, 
The Place of Classification in Private International Law, 19 Bell Yard 3, 5 (1937). 
Robertson suggests a distinction between the "process" of characterization and 
the "problem" of characterization. The former is when it is a simple matter to 
characterize a situation, the latter when there is difficulty, because different decisions 
could be made. He feels that an understanding of the "process" in simple cases will 
help to create ability to solve the "problem" when it arises. Ibid. 284-285. Under-
standing of such "processes" undoubtedly tends to avoid errors resulting from lack 
of appreciation of what is being done when "shorthand" reasoning is used. 
14§7(a). 
15Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), §7(a); 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws 
(1935), 55, §§7.1, 72; Beale, The Conflict of Laws, 1886-1936, 50 Harv.L.ReV'. 887, 
890 (1937); Cheshire, Private International Law (2d ed. 1938), 27-34; Falconbridge, 
Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Law Quar.Rev. 235, 244 (1937) ; Loren-
zen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws, 20 Coi.L.Rev. 247, 262-
263 (1920) ; Meriggi, Conflicts of Laws-A Theoretical Approach, 14 Boston Univ.L. 
ReV'. 319, 323-329, 348 (1934); Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws 
(1940), 25-27, 68-69. 
As shown by these writers, a view has been advanced abroad, by Despagnet, 
that characterization should be governed by the rnle of the jurisdiction which the 
fornm has selected to furnish the domestic law to govern the case before the court. 
How far the forum can and should do this will be discussed in the text. 
It has also been suggested that characterization should be governed by a body 
of principles developed internationally, and not a part of the law of any country. 
Meriggi, ibid. 329, 348. Beckett, who also advocates this, calls it "analytical juris-
prudence, a branch of legal science which is in essence purely general and theoret-
ical, and not national." Beckett, The Question of Classification ("Qualifications") in 
Private International Law, 15 Brit.Y.B.Int.Law 46, 72 (1934). This seems to be a 
purely theoretical approach, as a principle of characterization becomes a part of the 
law of any nation which adopts it, and apart from such adoption can not be law any-
where. It is a truism that "international law," at least up to the present moment, is 
really a misnomer. 
It has been suggested that this internationalist view has caused the entire subject 
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It is obvious that in every conflict-of-laws case the court necessarily 
has performed the process of what is now termed characterization. If the 
court has decided that a tort is to be governed by the law of the place where 
the tort occurred, it has, in the process, characterized the case as one of 
tort. Nearly always this has been done unconsciously, properly enough by 
the use of what Wigmore likes to call "shorthand reasoning." Only in the 
more difficult and borderline cases will it ever be necessary for the courts 
consciously to give attention to the process of characterization.16 Neverthe-
less it is through eareful consideration of such processes17 that a great deal 
of the progress of legal science is achieved. The unconscious practices of 
the courts are synthesized into a principle, which enables the courts to do 
their work more clearly, and assists in the future development of the law 
and the avoidance of errors. 
Various terms, as pointed out, have been used to describe the process 
now under consideration. The present writer feels that "characterization"18 
is the one which most aptly describes the nature of the determination which 
is being made. It seems to be a clear and natural mode of statement, and to 
be in harmony with ordinary usage, to say that the process is one of de-
of characterization to be discussed, particularly upon the Continent, much more than 
its importance would justify, because of the feeling of the "doomed" internationalist 
school, "which has so long dominated continental Private International Law," that in 
connection with characterization there exists a last opportunity to develop general 
conceptions to be applied by all countries and different from the internal law of any. 
Nussbaum, Review of Robertson: ibicl., 40 Col.L.Rev. 1461, 1469 (1940). See, fur-
ther, in regard to the internationalist school, Lorenzen, ibid., 268-282. 
Professors Nussbaum and Rheinstein question the value of the doctrine of 
characterization. The former says: "Especially with regard to characterization the 
question 'What price qualification' should be posited at the outset." lbicl., 1471. 
Professor Rheinstein feels "that more discussion is desirable . . . before quali-
fication is admitted to an established place in the American conflict of laws." Review 
of Harper & Taintor: Cases and Other Materials on Judicial Technique in Conflict 
of Laws, 8 Brooklyn L.Rev. 253, 262 (1938). He discusses a number of cases to 
make his point. lbicl., 256 et seq. Professor Rheinstein would include the forum's 
consideration of the nature of the problem as a part of its choice of a conflict-of-laws 
rule. He does not suggest what should be done by the forum if it has the renvoi 
doctrine, and does not desire to follow its own conflict-of-laws rule, and each of the 
other jurisdictions considered by the forum has such a view of the nature of the 
problem as to cause its domestic law to be applicable (or, conversely, each of the 
jurisdictions holds a view of the nature of the problem making its domestic law 
inapplicable). 
16This line of thought is well set forth in Robertson, The 'Preliminary Ques-
tion' in the Conflict of Laws, 55 Law Quar.Rev. 565 (1939). Because of the fact that 
courts generally are not conscious that they are performing the process of character-
ization, it has been compared by a German writer to ultra-violet rays which are only 
visible at certain altitudes. Wolff, Internationales Privatrecht (1933), 40; quoted, 
Unger, The Place of Classification in Private International Law, 19 Bell Yard 3, 5 
(1937). 
17Robertson analyzes in great detail the steps necessary in the solution of a 
conflict-of-laws case. Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 9, 17, 283. 
This will be developed later in the present article. For an analysis by Dean Falcon-
bridge, see Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Law Quar.Rev. 235, 236 
(1937). 
lSThis term was first suggested by Dean Falconbridge, of the Osgoode Hall 
Law School, of Toronto, who has done outstanding work in this field. Mortgages 
(2d ed. 1931), 734. 
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termining how, from a legal standpoint, the particular problem shall be 
characterized. As legal principles must be classified, throughout the law, in 
order that they may be studied systematically, it seems relatively artificial 
to assign to "classification" a technical meaning in the present connection. 
"Qualification" is open to the objection that it suggests a connotation of 
placing some sort of a limitation upon a principle. Under the title "Charac-
terization in the Conflict of Laws,"19 Mr. A. H. Robertson, an English bar-
rister, in some three hundred pages has given this problem more adequate 
consideration than has been received by any other discussed in this paper.20 
It is to be expected that Mr. Robertson's able work will incidentally have 
the effect of standardizing "characterization" as the term to be used in this 
country. 
The original process of characterization by the court of the forum, as 
above illustrated, is sometimes referred to as "primary." "Secondary'' char-
acterization is then used to refer to any additional process of characterization 
which may become necessary after the forum has decided to apply the law 
of another jurisdiction as the result of the primary determination. As will be 
developed in the following section, it may be accepted as settled that in 
secondary characterization the forum should follow the view of the jurisdic-
tion selected through the primary process. 
The theory of characterization was first formulated by Franz Kahn, a 
German, in 1891,21 and general attention was first directed to it by Bartin, 
a Frenchman, in 1897.22 It was introduced to Anglo-American legal 
thought by Professor Lorenzen, of the Yale Law School, in 1920.28 Bartin, 
thinking only of primary characterization, favored decision by the forum in 
accordance with its own views, reasoning that, insofar as the domestic law of 
any jurisdiction is applied, its sovereignty is being expanded, and that the 
forum could not be expected to look to other jurisdictions for conceptions of 
sovereignty.24 He felt that this was necessary in order to avoid the danger 
19Harvard University Press, 1940. 
20The present writer is only qualified to speak of works in the English language. 
Apart from this book, it is probably fair to say, as a general statement, that the 
original contributions upon problems discussed in this paper are to be found in legal 
periodicals, indicating the importance of periodical literature in furthering the devel-
opment of legal thought. 
21Gesetzeskollisionen: ein Beitrag zur Lehrc des intcrnationalen Privatrechts 
(1891), 30 Jherings Jahrbiicher fiir die Dogmatik des Heutigen Romischen und Dcut-
schen Privatrechts, 1-143; republished, 1 Abhandlungen zum Internationalen Privat-
recht von Franz Kahn, herausgegeben von Otto Lenel und Hans Lewald (1928), 
1-123. 
22De l'impossibilite d'arriver a la suppression definitive des conflits de lois, 
Ounet, 225-255, 466-495, 720-728 (1897); republished, Bartin, Etudes de Droit Inter-
national Prive (1899), 1-82. An excellent brief presentation of the reasoning of 
Bartin and others is to be found in Comment, Pascal, Characterization as an Ap-
proach to the Conflict of Laws, 2 La.L.Rev. 715 (1940). 
23The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws, 20 Col.L.Rev. 247 
(1920). The second extensive treatment in English was in Beckett, The Question of 
Classification ("Qualification") in Private International Law, 15 Brit. Y.B.Int.Law 46 
(1934). 
24Qunet: 236-239, Reprint 14-17; 469-470, Reprint 37-38 (1897). The views of 
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that other jurisdictions might deprive the forum completely of its sovereignty. 
Robertson25 properly criticizes this reasoning, upon the ground that the 
forum has no reason to fear loss of its sovereignty as long as it can change 
the situation at any time.26 He nevertheless reaches the same conclusion 
upon the basis of "practical convenience rather than logical necessity,"27 
feeling that "the difficulty of primary characterization is insoluble on 
logical grounds."28 He favors decision by the forum "simply because it is 
an easy, practical test in default of anything better."29 
The present writer feels that Robertson is correct in supporting de-
cision by the forum upon practical grounds. The difficulties of the judge 
and attorneys in any case are increased whenever it becomes necessary to 
apply the law of another jurisdiction. This burden should not be im-
posed upon them unless there is some compensating advantage to be 
secured.80 At first glance it seems paradoxical and absurd to suggest that 
the forum may properly apply the domestic law of another jurisdiction 
to a case, when a court of that jurisdiction would not do so, because it 
would characterize the question differently, and when, if the suit had been 
brought in some other forum, the result would have been different, because 
that court would have adopted an alternative characterization. However, 
characterization is important only when there is a conflict of authority as 
to the nature of a problem, and, under such circumstances, it is hard to 
see how anything is to be gained by asking the forum to adopt the 
characterization of another jurisdiction.81 As will be seen more clearly 
as this study progresses, a great deal of the field of conflict of laws, 
from the practical standpoint of the litigant, is a gamble depending upon 
the forum in which the litigation is brought.82 In most aspects of this 
field, this inevitably \vill continue to be true as long as such conflicts of 
authority continue to exist. So the existence of such a gamble is not a 
feature to distinguish one situation in this field from most of the others. 
Bartin and other writers are discussed in Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications 
and the Conflict of Laws, 20 Col.L.Rev. 247, 259 et seq. (1920). Consult Robertson, 
Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 1 et seq. 
25Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 69-80. 
26Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 72. 
27Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 74. 
28Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 75. 
29Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 74. It has also 
been argued, in support of the same conclusion, that the forum must have "a test 
the court can apply independently of the conflicting laws or supposed laws of legis-
latures and the conflicting opinion of parties." Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Delimitation 
of Right and Remedy in the Cases of Conflict of Laws, 16 Brit.Y.B.Int.Law 20, 40 
(1935). 
SOThis thought will appear from time to time throughout this study, as justify-
ing a basic presumption in favor of the forum's applying its own views. In the 
text, infra, at footnotes # #37 and 191-193, the grounds for the existence of such a 
presumption will be further discussed. 
SlCertain exceptions to this general statement will be considered shortly. 
S2Qf course the plaintiff, if well advised as to the conflict-of-laws aspects of his 
litigation, will endeavor to manipulate the choice of a forum to his advantage, but 
possibilities in this regard generally do not exist. 
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Of course the gamble should be eliminated wherever possible, and there 
will be suggestions along that line in this article, and even in this section, 
but in the ordinary situation of the type now under consideration it is 
impossible to do so. By the ordinary situation is meant one where there 
is disagreement among jurisdictions other than the forum,33 or between the 
forum and other jurisdictions,34 as to which of their systems of domestic 
law is properly applicable. In the first case, the forum can not yield to 
both, and so must follow its own view.35 In the second, the forum could 
not be expected to depart from its view.36 Other situations will be 
discussed shortly. 
Not only is there the practical argument that the forum should follow 
its own view, but it may also be suggested that, as a judge has taken an 
oath to administer the law to the best of his ability, there is a basic principle 
of integrity that he should follow his own judgment, subject to the views 
of his sovereignty, until he can find some good and sufficient reason for 
preferring the holdings of another sovereignty.37 This would seem to be 
a sufficient consideration to tip the balance of the scales of justice in a 
problem of this kind, when no countervailing influence can be found. This 
line of thought, and that in the preceding paragraph, will be relevant in 
connection with the discussion of other problems in this paper, in support 
of a general principle of presumption of adherence by the forum to its 
own views. 
We shall now, however, consider a situation where it is possible 
to eliminate the gamble dependent upon which jurisdiction is the forum. 
If the forum holds that its own domestic law is not applicable, and the 
other jurisdictions whose law might possibly be applicable agree upon 
the characterization, it is possible for the forum reasonably to yield to 
their view, although contrary to its own. This seems to reach a good 
result in this sort of case, and it has been suggested that here there 
should be an exception to the rule that the forum is to follow its own view.88 
33"fhe validity of this reasoning is not affected by the number of jurisdictions 
involved. It would hardly be contended that the forum should abandon its own 
views because of an adverse majority vote of other jurisdictions. 
34The number of such jnrisdictions is immaterial. The forum could hardly be 
expected to abandon its own views because of a majority vote against it. 
It is assumed that it is the view of the forum that its domestic law is 
applicable. The situation where this is not the case will be discussed shortly. 
35Beckett, The Question of Classification ("Qualification") in Private Inter-
national Law, 15 Brit.Y.B.Int.Law 46, 51 (1934). 
36Regardless of the number of jurisdictions opposed, which would not affect 
the forum's sense of justice. 
37"Self-effacement may be a fine moral gesture, but there is nothing to com-
mend it if the judge who indulges in it fiouts the law that it is his duty to 
administer." Cheshire, Private International Law (2d ed. 1938), 59. 
SBBeckett, The Question of Classification ("Qualification") in Private Interna-
tional Law, 15 Brit.Y.B.Int.Law 46, 62 (1934); Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifica-
tions and the Conflict of Laws, 20 Col.L.Rev. 247, 281 (1920); Robertson, Character-
ization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 76 et seq. Robertson states that the suggestion 
is offered "not so much as an exception to a general principle, but as a case where 
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It may be suggested that a further exception should be made in 
regard to matters of property and status. It is believed that the forum 
should adopt the characterization of the jurisdiction of situs or of 
domicile39 as to whether or not the problem is one of property4o or of 
status,41 respectively. As will be further emphasized as this study pro-
gresses, matters of property and of status stand out in the field of con-
flict of laws, in that there has always been universal agreement upon 
two basic principles of great practical importance, that matters of property 
are to be governed by the law of the situs, and matters of status by the 
law of the domicile. An exception to this statement in regard to foreign 
countries should be noted, in that under the civil law nationality generally 
is substituted for domicile.42 The obvious reason for agreement upon these 
basic principles has been the recognition of these very important matters 
as peculiarly subject to the control of the jurisdictions mentioned. Achieve-
ment of such control will be further accomplished insofar as the forum 
follows the characterization of the jurisdiction of situs or of domicile. Vari-
ous writers have pointed out that logically it is impossible for the forum 
to look to any other jurisdiction until it has first ascertained that the nature 
of the problem is such as to cause it to do so,43 but it is not believed that 
this is a serious objection to the suggestion made. It is certainly feasible 
for the forum to make a preliminary investigation as to the view of the 
jurisdiction of situs or of domicile, in any matter which might be con-
there is some reason for the judge to follow a particular characterization, and so no 
necessity for him to have recourse to that of the law of the forum in default of any-
thing better." Ibid. 78. 
39Determination of what is the situs or the domicile will be discussed under 
localization, §4, infra. With most foreign countries nationality must be substituted 
for domicile. 
40An example of such a problem is whether a c1•venant not running with the 
land is a property or a contract matter. Dean Falconbridge has said that the forum 
"must accept whatever the lex rei sitae says as to the nature of the claim, including 
the characterization by the lex rei sitae of the claimant's interest as being proprietary 
or otherwise." Conflict of Laws: Examples of Characterization, 15 Can.Bar Rev. 
215, 236 (1937). To the same effect: ibid., Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 
53 Law Quar.Rev. 235 & 537, 543 (1937) ; ibid., Renvoi, Characterization and Ac-
quired Rights, 17 Can.Bar Rev. 369, 378, 392 (1939). 
41"Further it would seem that the French courts have shown a disposition to 
accept, as a matter of personal status and capacity, rules of foreign law which were 
so regarded in that legal system, although, according to such evidence of the con-
ceptions of French internal law as is to be found in French jurisprudence, these 
rules ought to have been regarded as falling into another category, such as the 
form of acts, or procedure. Vide, for instance, the famous Arret Levin~;on, Clunet, 
1905, p. 1006 [wills abroad by Dutchmen], and the Leeuwn case, Clunet, 1928, p. 707 
[religious divorces of Russian Jews]." Beckett, The Question of Classification 
("Qualification") in Private International Law, 15 Brit. Y.B.Int.Law 46, 54 (1934). 
42The problem of nationality vs. domicile will be discussed later in this section. 
43Beckett, The Question of Oassification ("Qualification") in Private Inter-
national Law, 15 Brit. Y.B.Int.Law 46, 51 (1934) ; Lorenzen, The Theory of Quali-
fications and the Conflict of Laws, 20 Col.L.Rev. 247, 281 (1920) ; Robertson, Char· 
acterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 68. 
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sidered one of property or of status,44 and it is not imposing an unreasonable 
burden upon the forum to ask it to do so.45 
There is a possibility that, through the use of this suggested exception, 
the forum will find itself confronted with an insoluble dilemma-where 
the problem must be characterized as one of property or of status, and the 
jurisdictions of situs and of domicile each claim that the matter is one of 
property and of status, respectively,46 or, conversely, each claims that it is 
not. In such an unusual situation it is a relatively simple matter for the 
forum to fall back upon its own view. 
It has been pointed out, by those working in this field, that the cate-
gories required for purposes of characterization will sometimes be different 
from those utilized in the internal law of the forum.47 It seems clear that 
this is true, as the forum may have to characterize institutions or principles 
of foreign law unknown to the system of the forum,48 or to accommodate to 
a foreign system of law, as nearly as possible, institutions and principles 
44Dean Falconbridge has suggested "that the process of characterization should 
be a flexible one, involving the consideration of the provisions of potentially applic-
able laws and the con5equences of the selection of the proper law." Renvoi, Char-
acterization and Acquired Rights, 17 Can.Bar Rev. 369, 396 (1939). Further devel-
oping the same thought: ibid., 375; ibid., Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 
53 Law Quar.Rev. 235, 246 (1937) ; ibid., Conflict of Laws: Examples of Character-
ization,· 15 Can.Bar Rev. 215, 218 (1937). Professor Cavers in general terms has 
emphasized that it is desirable that the forum consider the results before deciding 
what choice of conflict-of-laws rules to make. A Critique of the Choice-of-Law 
Problem, 47 Harv.L.Rev. 173, 192, 208 (1933). 
45There is more to be said for the suggestion that the forum should yield to 
the jurisdiction of situs or of domicile when the principle operates affirmatively than 
when it applies negatively. If the jurisdiction of situs or of domicile holds affirma-
tively that the problem is one of property or of status, respectively, fora adopting 
the suggestion that they should yield are led to make the same holding in regard 
to the matter as the situs or the domicile. This seems obviously and eminently 
desirable in connection 'vith these matters, which stand out by themselves in the 
field of conflict of laws. On the other hand, if the jurisdiction of situs or of 
domicile holds negatively that the matter is not one of property or of status, there 
may still be uncertainty, as the forum may still be able to choose one or the other 
of two possible views. However, if the suggestion finds favor, in most instances 
certainty will be increased through letting it operate negatively as well as affirma-
tively, and if no distinction is made the state of the law will be that mueh more 
simple. The reason why certainty can be attained in regard to matters of property 
or of status, though not elsewhere in the field of conflict of laws, is because of the 
general agreement, mentioned in the text, upon the basic principles that matters of 
property are to be governed by the law of the situs, and matters of status by the 
law of the domicile (or, abroad, nationality). 
46Cf. Stumberg, Marital 'Property and the Conflict of Laws, 11 Tex.L.Rev. 53, 
54 et seq. (1932). With most foreign countries nationality must be substituted for 
domicile. 
47Cheatham, Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict of Laws, 21 Coru.L.Quar. 
570 (1936); Falconbridge, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Law Quar.Rev. 
235, 246 & 251-256 (1937) ; Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of 
Laws, 32 Yale L.Jour. 311, 330 (1923) ;. Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict 
of Laws (1940), 83-91, 167-168, 172, 187, 189 & 222-223. · 
48Falconbridge, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Law Quar. Rev. 
235, 254 (1937) ; Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 83. 
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of the forum unknown to the foreign law.49 Perhaps the best illustration 
of this is the divergence of the distinction between movable and immovable 
property, widely used abroad, from that between real and personal.'i9 
Another good illustration consists of the different meanings attached to 
the conception of a "penal" law.li1 The forum must consider the effect 
that an institution or principle of one system of law will have when 
introduced i~to a problem involving the other system.li2 The courts 
should be conscious of the fact that, in solving problems of characteriza-
tion, they are performing a distinct function in the field of conflict of laws, 
so that they will be "uncoerced by internal law terms and distinctions."liS 
It is the purpose of this study to consider problems only from the 
standpoint of the question of whether the forum should follow its own 
conflict-of-laws view or that of another jurisdiction. It is therefore out-
side the scope of this paper to consider how particular questions should be 
characterized. It may be helpful, however, to conclude our consideration 
of primary characterization with the presentation of a number of examples, 
phrased in the form of questions. 54 Included, toward the end of the list, 
are several involving decision whether a matter is one of substance or of 
procedure. It is a difficult question, upon which there is a difference of 
opinion, whether this is properly to be regarded as a problem of primary 
49Falconbridge, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Law Quar.Rev. 235, 
246 (1937). 
GOCheatham, Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict of Laws, 21 Corn.L.Quar. 
570, 580 (1936) ; Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 191, 195; 
See In re Allshouse's Estate, 13 Cal.(2d) 691, 91 Pac.(2d) 887 (1939), where 
property bad been brought from Missouri to California. 
lilCheatham, Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict of Laws, 21 Corn.LQuar. 
570, 571 (1936); Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws, 32 Yale 
L.J our. 311, 330 (1923). 
li2Cheatham, Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict of Laws, 21 Corn.L.Quar. 
570, 579 (1936). -
5SCheatham, Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict of Laws, 21 Corn.L.Quar. 
570, 571 (1936). The judge of the forum should characterize "according to the 
manner in which the corresponding rule of his own law bas been or would be 
classified, or, if there is no e."i:actly corresponding rule, then according to the 
manner in which the one that is most nearly analogous would be classified." 
Cheshire, Private International Law (2d ed. 1938), 27. 
li4It will be obvious from the nature of the questions that most of them may 
arise in cases which do not involve a problem of choice of a governing law ; and, as 
most cases before the courts are not conflict-of-laws cases, the chances are that the 
characterization of such cases will first occur in dealing with purely domestic prob-
lems. Most of the characterization cases discussed by Robertson and the other 
writers on the subject are not conflict-of-laws cases. Such discussion in this connec-
tion is, however, proper, because, while making due allowance for the divergence 
behveen the categories necessary for characterization and those used for domestic 
purposes, in most instances these purely domestic cases \vill be decisive of the 
question when presented in a conflict-of-laws case. One revjewer, while not 
criticising the use of domestic cases in the present connection, has referred to their 
presence in the discussions of characterization as supporting his thought that the 
subject is one of intellectual e."i:ercise rather than practical importance. Nussbaum, 
Review of Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 40 Col.L.Rev. 1461, 
1468 (1940). 
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or of secondary characterization. This will be discussed in the following 
section. The suggested examples of primary characterization are as follows : 
(a) Is a contractual limitation upon liability for injuries a matter of 
contract or of tort law ?55 
(b) Does a statute imposing liability for injuries upon one renting out 
an automobile set forth a rule of contract or of tort law ?56 
(c) Is a statutory requirement that a contract in behalf of a limited 
partnership must be executed by a certain number of partners a rule of 
agency, of the internal government of partnerships, or of the formalities of 
the execution of contracts ?57 
(d) Do questions in regard to the conversion of a life insurance policy 
relate to the creation of a new contract, or to the interpretation of the 
original one ?58 
(e) Do questions in regard to the discharge of a contract through tak-
ing a negotiable instrument relate to the creation of a new contract or to 
the discharge of the original one ?59 
(f) Is capacity to enter into a contract a matter of status or of 
contract ?60 
(g) Do the requirements as to the time and place of the performance 
of a contract relate to the validity or to the performance of the contract ?61 
(h) Is a rule imposing liability on one spouse upon a contract for 
necessaries entered into by the other a matter of status or of contract ?62 
( i) Does a covenant not running with the land relate to a matter of 
contract or to the title to land ?63 
(j) Is liability for the support of a bastard penal, tortious, or ali-
mentary?64 
55Cf. Rohertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws {1940), 182. 
56Cf. Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 Atl. 163 
(1928). 
57Cf. Parks Bros. & Co. v. Kelly Axe Mfg. Co., 49 Fed. 618 {C.C.A. 1st 1892). 
58Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389, 45 Sup.Ct. 129, 69 L. Ed. 
342 (1924); see, also, the discussion therein of the Dodge and Liebing cases. 
59Cf. Gilman v. Stevens, 63 N.H. 342, 1 Atl. 202 (1885). 
60"The rule that a married woman's capacity to enter into a personal contract 
is determined by the law of her domicil which on the continent of Europe is widely 
advocated has been almost universally rejected by the courts in the United States." 
Cheatham, Dowling & Goodrich, Cases and Other Materials on Conflict of Laws 
(1936), 471, footnote #7; c£.: 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), 1180, §333.3; Fal-
conhridge, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Law Quar. Rev. 235 & 537, 545 
1937); Comment, 15 Va.L.Rev. 704, 705 (1929). 
61Compare Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1935), §332(g), with ibid. §358(b). 
62Cf. Paquin v. Westervelt, 93 Conn, 513, 106 At!, 766 (1919) ; Mandell Bros. v. 
Fogg, 182 Mass. 582, 66 N.E. 198, 17 L.R.A.[N.S.] 426, 94 Am.St.Rep. 667 {1903). 
63Cf. Platner v. Vincent, 187 Cal. 443, 202 Pac. 655 (1921); Robertson, Charac-
terization in the Conflict of Laws {1940), 217 et seq. 
G4Cf. Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 190. 
1941] CONFLICT OF LAWS 233 
( k) Is liability of officers or stockholders for the debts of a corporation 
penal, contractual or quasi-contractual ?65 
(l) Under foreign law, is an obligation of the husband to pay the costs 
of his wife's lawsuit a matter of matrimonial property or of family rela-
tionship ?66 
( m) Is the effect of divorce upon an insurance policy a matter of status 
or of contract ?67 
( n) Do questions in regard to an indemnity bond executed in one juris-
diction against liability upon an appeal bond in another relate to a matter 
of contract or to the internal governmental affairs of a sovereignty ?68 
( o) Are exemplary damages penal ?69 
(P) Is an exemption law a matter of status or of procedure ?70 
(q) Is a question relating to who may sue upon a contract a matter of 
contract or of procedure ?71 
(r) Are presumptions matters of substance or of procedure?72 
( s) Is the parol evidence rule a matter of substance or of procedure ?73 
(t) Is the Statute of Frauds a matter of substance or of procedure?74 
( 1t) Are rules as to damages matters of substance or of procedure ?75 
(v) Are statutes of limitation matters of substance or of procedure?76 
( w) Is a statute providing that only a single action can be brought upon 
a secured debt a matter of substance or of procedure ?77 
(.1.·) Is a statute providing what steps must be taken to end the redemp-
tion rights of a conditional buyer a matter of substance or of procedure ?7S 
65N o general answer to this question can be given. Cf. Robertson, Character-
ization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 186. 
66Cf. Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 188. 
67Cf. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spence, 104 Fed.(2d) 665 (C.C.A. 2d 
1939), discussed in 13 SouTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REviEw, 117 (1939). 
68Cf. Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 1 Sup.Ct. 102, 27 L.Ed. 104 (1882). 
69In the famous Loucks case it was held that this depends upon the general 
nature of the liability. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 
N.E. 198 (1918). 
70Cf. 25 C.J.(l921), 13, §9. 
71C£. Carnegie v. Morrison, 2 Mete. 381 (Mass. 1841). 
72This should depend upon the nature of the particular presumption. Cf. Re-
statement, Conflict of Laws (1934), §584; Jones v. Chicago, St P., M. & 0. Ry., 80 
Minn. 488, 83 N.W. 446, 49 L.R.A. 640 (1900). 
7BThis should be considered a matter of substance. Restatement, Conflict of 
Laws (1934), §599. 
74Cf. Cochran v. Ward, 5 Ind.App. 89, 29 N.E. 795, 51 Am.StRep. 229 (1892) ; 
Falconbridge, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Law Quar.Rev. 235 & 537, 
538 (1937). 
75Cf. Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des Moines Natl. Bank, 127 Iowa 153, 98 N.W. 918, 
102 N.W. 836, 4 Ann.Cas. 519 (1904). 
76A distinction is drawn here between general and special statutes. Cf. Negau-
bauer v. Great Northern Ry., 192 Minn. 184, 99 N.W. 620, 104 Am.St.Rep. 674, 2 
Ann.Cas. 150 (1904). 
77Comment, 25 CAL.L.REv. 576 (1937). 
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2. (§3) SECONDARY CHARACTERIZATION 
As previously indicated, "secondary" characterization70 is any additional 
characterization which may become necessary after the forum has decided, as 
the result. of the "primary" process,80 to apply the law of another jurisdic-
tion. Here the universal opinion is that the forum should not follow its own 
view, but rather that of the jurisdiction whose law has been selected as con-
trolling.81 The reason for agreement that the forum should use the sec-
ondary characterization of the other jurisdiction, rather than its own, is to 
make effective the decision reached as the result of the primary characteriza-
tion. Robertson says that the rule exists "because consistency requires it."82 
The purpose of looking to the law of the other jurisdiction is to dispose of 
the problem as it would be disposed of there.83 It seems clear that this 
purpose would be defeated to the extent that the forum should fail to use 
the portion of the law of that jurisdiction which, in the judgment of that 
jurisdiction,84 relates to the problem. If sufficient reason in support of the 
rule that the foreign characterization should control is not manifest, it is 
believed that it will become so as the discussion progresses. 
78Cf. Thomas G. Jewett, Jr., Inc. v. Keystone Driller Co., 282 Mass. 469, 185 
N.E. 369, 87 A.L.R. 1298 (1933). 
79Secondary characterization has been referred to as a process of "classification." 
Unger, The Place of Classification in Private International Law, 19 Bell Yard 3, 
16-21 (1927). Also as a matter of "sub-classifications." Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, De-
limitation of Right and Remedy in the Cases of Confiict of Laws, 16 Brit.Y.B.Int.Law 
20, 41 (1935). 
so". . . A question of secondary characterization . . . only arises after 
the selection of the appropriate c~mflicts rule and the choice of the proper law." 
Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 64. To the same effect: 
ibid. 119. 
SlBeckett, The Question of Oassification ("Qualification") in Private Interna-
tional Law, 15 Brit.Y.B.Int.Law 46, 75 (1934) ; Cheshire, Private International Law 
(2d ed. 1938), 38, 42; Falcon bridge, Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights, 
17 Can.Bar Rev. 369, 373 (1939) ; Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Delimitation of Right and 
Remedy in the Cases of Conflict of Laws, 16 Brit.Y.B.Int.Law 20, 41 (1935) ; Robert-
son, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 130 et seq. 
In rare instances, when the renvoi doctrine is being applied, decision as to 
secondary characterization may be referred on to the law of a third jurisdiction, or 
back to the law of the forum, but it is not believed that this will offer any special 
difficulty, in the light of the discussion of the renvoi problem in the text, infra, 
§§6-20. In all probability, if the renvoi doctrine is being applied, the secondary 
characterization aspect of the problem will be correctly taken care of through 
"shorthand" reasoning. But cf. footnote #94, infra. 
S2Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 131. 
S3Assuming agreement upon the part of that jurisdiction as to primary charac-
terization, which will generally exist. 
84"If the English court says substance is go~erned by French law, but applies 
the English characterization of what is substance, then it will simply not be applying 
the French law of substance; in the words of Beckett, it will be 'applying a law 
which is not French or English, or indeed, the law of any country whatever.' " Rob-
ertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 131, citing Beckett, The 
Question of Oassification ("Qualification") in Private International Law, 15 Brit.Y. 
Int.Law 46, 55 (1934). The present writer feels that this is an C.'Ccellent general 
statement, but, as mentioned previously, and as will be discussed in the text later in 
this section, he feels that the distinction between substance and procedure is a matter 
of primary characterization. To quote Robertson again: "That 'capacity by the law 
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Secondary characterization, like primary, may relate to principles and 
institutions of the forum or of any other jurisdiction connected with the 
facts of the case. It is of three types :85 
( 1) Delimiting the problem as defined by the law of the foreign juris-
diction. 56 For example, if the problem is primarily characterized as one of 
property, it must be ascertained what principles the foreign jurisdiction con-
siders as included in the body of property law. 
(2) Subdividing the problem in the light of the necessities of the for-
eign jurisdiction.87 For example, let us suppose that the forum, jurisdic-
tion A, has primarily characterized the problem as one of the creation of a 
marital status between two minors domiciled in jurisdiction B, and therefore 
to be governed by its law.88 Without the consent of their parents, they have 
gone through a ceremony in jurisdiction C. Jurisdiction B applies its own 
domestic law to questions of capacity to marry, and that of the jurisdiction 
where the ceremony is performed to matters relating to the form and validity 
of the ceremony. 89 It must be determined as a matter of secondary char-
acterization in which category lack of consent of the parents falls. 90 
of the domicil' must involve the characterization of domiciliary law seems not open 
to doubt." Ibid. 132. 
85Nussbaum, using "qualification" as synonymous with "characterization," has 
criticized the former term, particularly in connection with the secondary process, as 
"coordinating heterogeneous elements." Review of Robertson: Characterization in 
the Conflict of Laws, 40 Col.L.Rev. 1461, 1467 (1940). Rheinstein has also criticized 
it, upon the ground that it "has been applied . . • to a number of different prob-
lems, the clarification of which does not appear to be furthered by their being 
lumped together under one label." Review of Harper & Tainter : Cases and Other 
Materials on Judicial Technique in Conflict of Laws, 8 Brooklyn L.Rev. 253, 256 
(1938). The present writer feels that the convenience of being able to treat these 
various types of related problems together, as is being done in the text, justifies the 
terminology. 
Both the writers quoted have also pointed out that such a term as "qualifica-
tion" or "characterization" could be used in a broader sense, and would suggest 
organization of facts in legal categories for any purpose, but it is believed that this 
is not sufficient to outweigh the advantages from the use of such terminology in the 
more limited technical sense here employed. Nussbaum, ibid., 1462; Rheinstein, ibid. 
255. 
86Secondary characterization has sometimes been denominated a process of 
"delimitation." Unger, The Place of Classification in Private International Law, 
19 Bell Yard 3, 16 (1937). "The problem of secondary characterization is to find 
out just how much of the foreign and domestic law is applicable to the aspects of 
the case referred to each of them." Robertson, Characterization in the Confiict of 
Laws (1940), 118. To the same effect, ibid. 130. See also, Falconbridge, Renvoi, 
Characterization and Acquired Rights, 17 Can.Bar Rev. 369, 373 (1939). 
87This is in addition to subdivision of the case by the forum into various prob-
lems, which will be discussed in the text. 
88Including, even in this country, its conflict-of-laws principles. This constitutes 
application of the renvoi doctrine, normally rejected in the United States. This 
exception· to the American rejection of that doctrine will be discussed in §9, infra. 
With most foreign countries nationality must be substituted for domicile. 
89Application by the forum of the domestic law of this jurisdiction involves 
recognition of the renvoi doctrine. See §9, it~fra. 
90For discussion, not distinguishing between primary and secondary character-
ization, see: Falconbridge, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Law Quar.Rev. 
235, 247 (1937); Harper & Tainter, Cases and Other Materials on Judicial Technique 
in Conflict of Laws (1937), 292; 1 Johnson, Conflict of Laws (1934), 287; Robertson, 
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(3) Further characterizing the e~tire problem, in order to fit it into the 
domestic law of the foreign jurisdiction. For example, if the forum has 
characterized the problem as one of property, it may be necessary to ascer-
tain through secondary characterization whether the property is considered 
real or personal in the jurisdiction of situs. 91 
While it will always be difficult to tell where to draw the line in dis-
tinguishing between primary and secondary characterization, it is believed 
that the distinction is sound, 92 and that the case system will work well here, 
clarifying the distinction through developing illustrations as the actual prob-
lems arise. The difficulty is largely in deciding how far to subdivide a 
case into problems in the primary process. An excellent illustration, just 
referred to, is the question whether property situated in a jurisdiction other 
than the forum is to be treated as real or personal.98 It seems to be agreed94 
that the forum will follow the view of the jurisdiction of situs, 9 ti but it has 
been contended that this is an exception to the rule that primary characteri-
zation is decided in accordance with the views of the forum. 90 This latter 
Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 239 et seq. 2 Beale, Conflict of 
Laws (1935), 673-674, §121.6, discusses the question of the governing law, not con-
sidering the characterization aspect. Rheinstein, Review of Harper & Taintor: ibid., 
8 Brooklyn L.Rev. 253 (1938), considers that no problem of characterization is 
involved here. 
While Cheshire suggests as an illustration of primary characterization whether 
a requirement of parental consent to the marriage of minors is a matter of capacity 
to marry or of form of the marriage ceremony, it is believed that the problem is 
clearly one of status, and that it is simply a question whether the public policy of 
the jurisdiction of domicile causes it to apply its own rules on such a matter or those 
of the jurisdiction where the ceremony is performed. Cheshire, Private International 
Law (2d ed. 1938), 34. 
91Whether this is a matter of primary or secondary characterization will be 
discussed in the text. 
92Professor Yntema feels that its validity is open to question. Review, of 
Robertson: Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 4 Univ.Toronto L.Jour. 233, 234 
(1941). 
93Qr, under a foreign system, movable or immovable. Cheshire, Private Inter-
national Law (2d ed. 1938), 409; Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the 
Confiict of Laws,· 20 CoLL.Rev. 247, 255 (1920) ; Robertson, Characterization in the 
Conflict of Laws (1940), 193 et seq. A similar problem is whether property is tan-
gible or intangible. 
94Apart from a minority of foreign writers who contend that all characteriza-
tion should be in accordance with the views of the forum, and so, of course, do not 
make any distinction between primary and secondary. Lorenzen, The Theory of 
Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws, 20 Col.L.Rev. 247, 255 (1920) ; Robertson, 
Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 190. 
95Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), §208: "Whether an intei,"est in a tan-
gible thing is classified as real or personal property is determined by the law of the 
state where the thing is." See also: Bartin, 24 Clunet 251 ct seq. (1897) ; 2 Beale, 
Conflict of Laws (1935), 934, §208.1; Cheshire, Private International Law (2d ed. 
1938), 43; Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws, 20 Col. 
L.Rev. 247 (1920); Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 194, 
211; Unger, The Place of Oassification in 'Private International Law, 19 Bell Yard 
3, 9 (1937). 
96Bartin, De l'Impossibilite d'Arriver a la Suppression Definitive des Confits 
des Lois, 24 Journal du· Droit International Prive 225, 246 (1897), Qunet 466, 720 
(1897); Cheshire, Private International Law (2d ed. 1938), 44; Lorenzen, The Theory 
of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws, 20 Col.L.Rev. 247, 268 (1920). Robertson 
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contention would mean that the question in primary characterization is 
whether the problem involved relates to a real property matter or to one of 
personal property. To the present writer it seems clear that the question 
for primary characterization is whether the problem relates to a property 
matter, and that it must then be decided by secondary characterization 
whether the property is real or personal. 07 A closely allied question is 
whether there has been an equitable conversion of property.08 
"The characterization of property probably represents the most difficult 
problem in the whole field of characterization.''99 It is certainly true that 
the characterization of property offers a fertile field for differences of opinion 
as to where to draw the line between the primary and secondary processes. 
For practical purposes this becomes unimportant if, as previously sug-
gested,l00 the forum, as an exception to the general rule, yields upon primary 
characterization whenever the jurisdiction of situs or of domicile claims that 
the matter is one of property or of status, respectively. In the list of sug-
gives as his reason for holding that it is primary, that "different rules relate to 
movables and immovables, and it is impossible for the judge to know which rule to 
apply until he has made this detennination." Characterization in the Conflict of 
Laws (1940), 58. This is meaningless, as a reason here, as the whole purpose of 
both primary and secondary characterization is to determine which law to apply. See 
also, ibid. 74. 
97While he does not distinguish between primary and secondary characterization, 
the reasoning of Dean Falcon bridge is in hannony with the view taken in the text: 
"Any question of conflict of laws relating to a thing may involve in effect two 
questions, namely, the main question, whether a person has a proprietary interest, 
and a subsidiary question, whether that interest is an interest in an immovable. It 
being premised that the main question must be decided by the les rei .sitae, it follows 
necessarily that the les rei sitae must also govern the subsidiary question. This sub-
sidiary question turns on the distinction between immovables and movables, and not 
upon the distinction between realty and personalty or any other distinction 
based upon the peculiar features of the internal land law. The distinction be-
tween realty and personalty is in no case material to the selection of the 
proper law, but may be material in the application of the selected proper law, 
if that law is one which for domestic purposes distinguishes between realty and 
personalty." Falconbridge, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Law Quar. 
Rev. 235 & 537, 561 (1937). In the third sentence quoted, the learned writer is 
assuming that the jurisdiction looked to is one that divides property into movable 
and immovable rather than into real and personal. The position taken in the text 
of the present article is clearer when such is the case, and the forum is a juris-
diction having the real-personal distinction. Dean Falconbridge, continuing, points 
out that, on principle, proprietary interests in movables should be as much governed 
by the les rei sitae as those in immovables, but that the practical necessity for con-
trol by the law of the situs is not as great. Ibid. 562. 
98Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), §209: "Whether interests in land are 
equitably converted into personal property by dealings with the land depends upon 
the la'v of the state where the land is." Ibid. §210: ''Whether interests in chattels 
and intangible things are equitably converted into real property by dealings with the 
chattels or intangible things depends upon the law which governs such dealings." 
Ibid. §244: "Whether the interest of the beneficiary of a trust of land is real estate 
or whether, because of a direction to sell the land, it is personal property, is deter-
mined by the law of the state where the land is." See also, 2 Beale, Confiict of Laws 
(1935), 935, §209.1. Robertson treats this under primary characterization. Char-
acterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 197. 
99Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 190. See also 
ibid., further. 
10.0§2, at footnote # 39, S1tpra; but see, footnote # 46, same section. 
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gested illustrations of secondary characterization which will be given, there 
will be included a number considered by Robertson to be primary.101 
Another interesting question, as already suggested,102 is whether it is a 
matter of primary or of secondary characterization to distinguish between 
matters of substance and procedure.103 While there is much to be said 
theoretically for considering the distinction a matter of secondary char-
acterization, in order to lead the forum more completely to decide the case 
in accordance with the law of the foreign jurisdiction, it is believed that, as 
a practical matter, the forum can not be expected to yield. From the stand-
point of the forum, any matter considered by it to be one of procedure can 
not be any more than a borderline matter in applying the law of another 
jurisdiction, and the difficulties of the forum would be greatly increased if 
it were to attempt to apply any parts of a system of procedure other than 
its own. The Restatement, Beale, Falconbridge, and an Arkansas case, sup-
port the position here taken/04 while Robertson and McClintock are of the 
opposite opinion.105 
In conclusion, the following additional illustrations of secondary char-
acterization may be suggested : 
(a) Under the civil law, is the purchase of groceries for consumption 
by a family a civil or a commercial act, and accordingly to be governed by 
the Civil Code or by the Commercial Code ?106 
101It can hardly be assumed that there will be universal acceptance of the sug-
gestion in the text that the forum should yield upon primary characterization in 
connection with property and status matters, and that therefore illustrations relating 
to these matters have no practical value. 
102§2, at footnote #54, supra. 
1031£ determined to be the latter, the forum follows its own system. Restate-
ment, Conflict of Laws (1934), §585. 
104Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), §584: "The court at the forum deter-
mines according to its own Conflict of Laws rule whether a given question is one of 
substance or procedure." To the same effect, ibid., §7, Comment (b). Setting forth 
the line of thought reproduced in the text: 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), 55, 
§7.2; 3 ibid., 1599-1601, §§584.1-584.2. Accord: Falconbridge, Renvoi, Characteriza-
tion and Acquired Rights, 17 Can.Bar Rev. 369, 375 (1939). 
In St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Cox, 171 Ark. 103, 113, 283 S.W. 31, 35 
(1926), Mr. Justice Wood said: ". . . The Missouri Supreme Court treats the 
matter . . . as 'a matter going to the basis of the right of action itself.' It is 
a matter of substance . . . But under our decisions [it] relates only to the 
remedy. . . • It is a universal rule that laws relating to the remedy can have no 
extraterritorial effect." The case is discussed, Nussbaum, Review of Robertson: 
Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 40 Col.L.Rev. 1461, 1469 (1940). 
105Mc0intock, Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 
78 Univ.Pa.L.Rev. 933 (1930) ; Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws 
(1940), 119 et seq. & 246 et seq. Cheshire feels that it is a matter of secondary 
characterization, but that, as an exception, the forum must follow its own view. 
Private International Law (2d ed. 1938), 38; discussed, Robertson, ibid., 56. 
". . . The German courts accept the English and United States classification 
of their own statutes of limitation as procedure, although according to German views 
they should in principle be regarded as substance • . . : on the other hand, the 
German courts refused to recognize Article 992 of the Nether lands Civil Code as 
having a personal character. . . ." Beckett, The Question of Classification 
("Qualification") in Private International Law, 15 Brit.Y.B.Int.Law 46, 54 (1934). 
106It is assumed that the forum is a common law jurisdiction. This is prob-
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(b) As to parties domiciled outside the forum, is a prohibition m a 
divorce decree against remarriage within a certain period penal ?107 
(c) As to personal property outside the forum at the death of a dece-
dent, is it a matter of testamentary capacity or of the formalities of the 
execution of wills whether a holographic will is valid ?108 
(d) As to land outside the forum, is a problem relating to a widow's 
election between dower and her husband's will to be treated as a matter of 
status or of inheritance ?109 
(e) As to property outside the forum, does a question as to the appar-
ent authority to deal with the property, of an agent appointed in a third 
jurisdiction, relate to the law of agency or of property ?110 
(f) As to personal property outside the forum at the death of a hus-
band, and owned at marriage, are the rights of the widow to be treated as 
a matter of status or of property ?111 
ably a better illustration of secondary characterization than any not involving a civil 
law country. As the distinction between civil and commercial acts pervades almost 
the entire law of civil law countries, this secondary characterization is almost certain 
to be necessary whenever a common-law court looks to the law of a civil-law country. 
The answer to the particular question is that, at least in Mexico, if the grocer is 
defendant in the litigation in the forum, the purchase is considered a commercial act, 
but if the purchaser is the defendant it is considered civil. Barker & Cormack, The 
Mercantile Act: A Study in Mexican Legal Approach, 6 SouTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW 
REvmw, 1, 2-22 (1932). The title of the cited article is misleading, as a great deal 
of the material applies to the mercantile act as it exists in all civil-law countries. 
See also, Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws, 20 Col.L. 
Rev. 247, 258 (1920). 
107The question \vill arise when a divorce is granted in the jurisdiction of 
domicile and remarriage occurs in another State. The primary characterization is 
that the matter is one of status, therefore to be governed by the law of the domicile. 
While the forum will not enforce a penal law of another jurisdiction, it will recog-
nize an effect upon status of foreign citizens resulting from one. 
10B"It is a generally recognized rule of the conflict of laws on the continent 
that testamentary capacity \vith regard to movables is governed by the personal law 
of the deceased and that the formalities of a will are governed by the law of the 
place where it is executed. . • ." Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of 
Laws (1940), 236. The primary characterization is that the matter is one of prop-
erty. 
109It is assumed that the parties are domiciled in a third State. The primary 
characterization is that the matter is one of property. The jurisdiction of situs will 
not disagree as to this, but will have to decide whether, under its public policy as to 
property, it will follow the domiciliary rule upon the ground that it affects the status 
of interested individuals. Robertson considers this included in the primary char-
acterization. Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 219. 
110The illustration is better if it is assumed that the agent is appointed in a 
jurisdiction other than that in which the property is situated. The matter is primar-
ily characterized as one of property. The jurisdiction of situs will then have to 
decide whether the particular question is within the scope of its body of property 
law. Cf. Charles T. Dougherty Co., Inc. v. Krimke, 105 N.J.L. 470, 144 Atl. 617 
(1929). 
111The illustration is better if it is assumed that the husband was not domiciled 
in the forum. The primary characterization is that the matter is one of property. 
The jurisdiction of situs will have to decide whether, under its public policy as to 
property, it will look to the domiciliary rule as 'involving the status of interested 
parties. Robertson considers this included in the primary characterization. Char-
acterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 158. See, not distinguishing between 
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(g) As to property outside the forum at the death of a decedent, is a 
question in regard to legitimation or adoption of a claimant to be treated as 
a matter of status or of property ?112 
(h) As to personal property outside the forum at the death of a 
decedent, is a question in regard to revocation of a will by subsequent 
marriage or by the birth of a child to be treated as a matter of the law of 
wills or of property ?113 
( i) As to personal property outside the forum at the death of a 
decedent, is a gift in contemplation of death inter vivos or testamentary ?14 
(j) Is the effect, upon the death of one of the parties, of a joint deposit 
in a bank outside the forum, a trust or a testamentary matter ?115 
primary and secondary characterization: Falcon bridge, Characterization in the Con-
flict of Laws, 53 Law Quar.Rev. 235 & 537, 539 (1937) ; Lorenzen, The Theory of 
Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws, 20 Col.L.Rev. 247, 257 (1920). 
112Jt is assumed that the alleged legitimation or adoption occurred in a juris-
diction other than that of the situs, and the illustration is better if it is assumed 
that none of the parties were domiciled at the forum or the situs. The primary 
characterization is that the matter is one of property. The jurisdiction of situs must 
decide whether, under its public policy in regard to property, it will look to a domi-
ciliary rule upon the ground that the status of interested parties is involved. For 
discussion of these problems, not noticing the characterization aspect, see 2 Beale, 
Conflict of Laws (1934), 967, §§246.2-247.1 & 1033, §§304.1-305.1. In an article, Pro-
fessor Beale raises the characterization question in regard to inheritance by illegiti-
mates, without distinguishng between primary and secondary. The Conflict of Laws, 
1~1936, 50 Harv.L.Rev. 887, 890 (1937). For a discussion of legitimation with 
another method of approach, which wilt be discussed in §5, infra, see Robertson, 
Characterization in the Conflict of. Laws (1940), c. VI, pp.135-156. 'Professor Rhein-
stein considers that no problem of characterization is involved here. Review of 
Harper & Taintor: Cases and Other Materials on Judicial Technique in Conflict of 
Laws, 8 Brooklyn L.Rev. 253, 256 (1938). 
113It is assumed that the alleged revocation occurred when the decedent was 
domiciled in a jurisdiction other than the situs. The primary characterization is 
that the matter is one of property. The alternative expressed in the question, 
between the law of wilts and that of property, can be expressed more exactly by 
saying that the jurisdiction of situs is confronted with the problem, under its public 
policy in regard to property, as to how to divide its body of property law between 
those matters as to which it will look to the law of the jurisdiction of domicile of 
the decedent, and those matters where it will apply its own domestic law. This is a 
problem of secondary characterization, as the decision will tum upon the viewpoint 
of the jurisdiction of situs as to whether it is sound public policy that the question 
should be regarded as per se relating to wilts or to property as such. Problems of 
secondary characterization are as subject to practical considerations of public policy 
as any other part of the law. See, as' to marriage, not distinguishing between 
primary and secondary characterization, Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws: Examples 
of Characterization, 15 Can.Bar Rev. 215, 227 (1937). An answer to the question 
is given in Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), §307. 
114It is assumed that the property was not at the domicile of the decedent, 
and the illustration is better if it is assumed that the decedent was not domiciled 
at the forum. The primary characterization is that the matter is one of praperty. 
Contra: Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 184. 
115The primary characterization is that the matter is one of property. Contra: 
Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 171. 
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Ill. (§4) LOCALIZATION 
When a court has completed characterization of a problem,U6 it selects 
a "connecting factor"117 which causes it to relate the case to the law of a 
particular jurisdiction. The connecting factor may be, for example, the 
domicile of a party, the situs of property, or the place where a tort or crime 
occurred, an agent acted, or a marriage ceremony was performed. 
Normally the court will not be aware that anything more than a ques-
tion of fact is involved in designating the particular foreign jurisdiction 
which fits the description called for by the connecting factor-if there is a 
legal element it will ordinarily be taken care of through "shorthand" reason-
ing. If a legal question does consciously arise, as when the person whose 
domicile must be determined is returning to his domicile of origin, 118 or 
when it become~ necessary to assign a situs to intangibles, 119 the prob-
lem120 is not one of characterization, as the nature of the problem is clear-
it is entirely a question of selecting one or the other of two specific rules to 
govern selection of a domicile, etc. This process of selection of a specific 
rule for the identification of the jurisdiction indicated by the connecting 
factor (together with any necessary fact investigation) has been termed the 
"localization" of the connecting factor.121 While localization has generally 
116!t is assumed that, as a result, the forum does not desire to apply its own 
domestic law. 
117The term was originated by Dean Falconbridge, Olaracterization in the Con-
flict of Laws, 53 Law Quar.Rev. 235, 236 (1937), and is used in Robertson, Char-
acterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 92. Professor Lorenzen has used the 
term "point of contact," The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws, 20 
Col.L.Rev. 247, 268 (1920), and Unger "elements of introduction." The Place of 
Classification in Private International Law, 19 Bell Yard 3 (1937). For a discussion 
of foreign terms, see Falconbridge, 53 Law Quar.Rev. 537, 549 (1937). 
The same case may involve more than one connecting factor. For example, in 
a contract case, the forum may use the places of contracting and of performance. 
118Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 110. The same 
sort of question arises in connection with matrimonial domicile. In most foreign 
countries nationality controls status. 
119Such as negotiable instruments, stock certificates and debts in general. Fal-
conbridge, Conflict of Laws : Examples of Characterization, 15 Can.Bar Rev. 215, 
239-240 (1937). 
12DAs another illustration, it may be difficult to ascertain the place of execution 
of a contract, particularly insurance contracts. Robertson, Characterization in the 
Conflict of Laws (1940), 225. In a situation involving foreign countries, a difficult 
problem may be presented when an offer is sent from one country and the acceptance 
despatched from another. By the law of one country the contract may come into 
existence when the acceptance is sent, and by the law of the other when it is 
received. In connection \vith personal property, it may be necessary to ascertain the 
situs at a particular time. Hellendall, The Res in Transitu and Similar Problems in 
the Conflict of Laws, 17 Can.Bar Rev. 7 & 105, 109 (1939). Cheshire discusses (as 
though characterization) the situs of a debt secured by a charge on land. Private 
International Law (2d ed. 1938), 411. Robertson gives a number of illustrations 
of such problems in the field of torts. Robertson, ibid., 227. 
121Unger, The Place of Oassification in Private International Law, 19 Bell 
Yard 3, 4, 16 (1937). The present writer has "Americanized" the spelling. Nuss-
baum has suggested that the connecting factor may be termed the "localizator." 
Review of Robertson: Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 40 Col.L.Rev. 1461, 
1464 (1940). Robertson states that the connecting factor is "localized." Robertson, 
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been treated as in~luded within characterization,l22 it is believed advisable, 
for clarity of thinking in a new field, to recognize the distinction between the 
two processes.123 
Whatever law, i.e., the law of whatever jurisdiction, is selected to gov-
ern characterization, will also govern localization.124 The same considera-
tions apply in regard to the selection of a governing system of law for both 
processes. The same danger of an otherwise i.nsoluble dilemma exists. For 
example, if the forum desires to look to the domicile ot a party, each of the 
possible jurisdictions of domicile may claim that it is the true domicile, or, 
conversely, each may claim that it is not. The same exception suggested in 
connection with characterization, that when the jurisdictions which are con-
sidered possibilities agree as to the rule to be adopted, they should be yielded 
Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 8, 102. Falconbridge says that "the 
thing or the act is necessarily localized." Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 
53 Law Quar.Rev. 235 & 537, 550 (1937). 
122Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), §7, Comment (b) ; 1 Beale, Conflict 
of Laws (1935), 55, §§7.1-7.2; Beckett, The Question of Qassification ("Qualifica-
tion") in Private International Law, 15 Brit.Y.B.IntLaw 46, 61 (1934) ; Lorenzen, 
The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws, 20 Col.L.Rev. 247, 248 ct seq. 
(1920). 
· Robertson says that when it is necessary to decide such problems as where a 
man is domiciled, or where a contract was made, "what the judge does when he 
'qualifies' is to characterize some of the facts presented to him as constituting a con-
necting factor with some particular system of law (usually a foreign system of law 
in a case that involves conflict of laws)." Characterization in the Conflict of Laws 
(1940), 11. See also ibid. 105-106. · 
Falconbridge says that two countries may "both use nominally the same con-
necting factor with respect to a question which is characterized in the same way in 
both countries, and nevertheless there may be a latent conflict of conflict rules, 
because the place element specified as the appropriate connecting factor in the conflict 
rule of one country may be characterized differently from the place element specified 
in the corresponding conflict rule of the other country." Characterization in the 
Conflict of Laws, 53 Law Quar.Rev. 235 & 537, 551 (1937). 
Cheshire calls characterization "classification of a rule of Private International 
Law itself."' Private International Law (2d ed. 1938), 29. 
123Following Unger, The Place of Qassification in Private International Law, 19 
Bell Yard 3, 4-5 (1937). 
124With a single e.xception, only localization of a connecting factor selected as 
the result of primary characterization has been considered by the writers, who have 
been unanimous that the forum is to follow its own views. 
Robertson says: ". • . There is general agreement among the Anglo-Amer-
ican writers that the connecting factor must be determined by the law of the forum. 
. . • This unanimity is probably due to the fact that the determination of domicile 
is usually taken as the typical case, and this is one of the few examples of the 
characterization problem which has been consciously and consistently dealt with by 
the courts." Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 107-108. See also 
ibid. 225-229. Accord: Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), §§10 &311, Comment 
(d) ; 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), 105, §10.1; 2 ibid. 1046, §311.2; Beckett, The 
Question of Classification ("Qualification") in Private International Law, 15 Brit Y. 
B.Int.Law 46, 62 (1934); Cheshire, Private International Law (2d ed. 1938), 29; 
Falconbridge, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Law Quar.Rev. 235 & 537, 
555 (1937) ; Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws, 20 
Coi.L.Rev. 247, 268 (1920) ; Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Renvoi in Modern English Law 
(1937), 36;. Unger, The Place of Classification in Private International Law, 19 Bell 
Yard 3, 4 (1937). 
Harper and Taintor suggest, as to localization: "The solution of this problem 
may be avoided (1) by ignoring it altogether, or (2) by refusing to recognize it as 
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to, applies here.125 The exception suggested, in connection with primary 
characterization, that the jurisdiction of situs or of domicile should be 
yielded to if it claims that the matter is one of property or of status, respec-
tively,l26 by its nature can not apply here, as the problem with localization 
is to determine which is the jurisdiction of situs or of domicile. 
It may be helpful to think of localization as the fitting of the minor 
premise into a syllogism the major premise of which has been stated as the 
result of the process of characterization. The syllogism will run thus : 
This problem (because characterized as a certain sort of problem) is gov-
erned by the law of the domicile. Jurisdiction B (because of the rule used 
in localization) is the domicile. Therefore, this problem is governed by the 
law of jurisdiction B. 
When the forum looks to the law of another jurisdiction for secondary 
characterization, it will likewise do so for the localization of any connecting 
factor selected through the secondary characterization.127 Therefore the 
distinction between primary and secondary forms is applicable to localization 
in the same manner as to characterization. 
IV. (§5) PRELIMINARY QUESTION 
Another doctrine, although believed illusory, must be discussed, in order 
that this survey may be complete. It is that of the so-called "preliminary 
question",128 recently advanced upon the Continent.129 The doctrine is that 
if the forum finds that a "main" or "principal" question turns upon the 
decision of a "preliminary" question, the conflict-of-laws rule of the juris-
diction looked to upon the principal question should govern the preliminary 
question. 
a problem to be solved by the law of any particular state." Cases and Other Mate-
rials on Judicial Technique in the Conflict of Laws (1937), 158. The present writer 
does not agree with them, ibid., that the Restatement seems to have adopted the 
second alternative mentioned. 
The only writer who seems to have considered the possibility that localization 
might be referred on to the law of another jurisdiction, under the same circumstances 
and in the same manner as characterization, is Robertson. Ibifi. 110. This is un-
doubtedly sound, as will be noted in the text. 
125See §2, supra, at footnote #38. As to domicile a caveat is attached to Re-
statement, Conflict of Laws (1934), §10. See Beckett, The Question of Classification ("Qualification") in Private International Law, 15 Brit.Y.B.Int.Law 46, 62 (1934). 
126See §2, supra, at footnote #39. With most foreign countries nationality 
must be substituted for domicile. 
127A connecting factor will be selected thus only in connection with an appli-
cation of the renvoi doctrine. 
12BThe French term for the doctrine is la qfeestion prealable, and the German 
die V or/rage. Robertson feels that "primary characterization of the second order," 
suggested by Professor Griswold, "would seem to afford a better description of the 
process involved," but is too cumbersome to serve as a name. Robertson, Characteri-
zation in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 137. 
129First by the Italian author, Anzilotti. Breslauer, Private International 
Law of Succession (1937), 18. Nussbaum states that the problem "was discovered 
in 1932 by a German writer." Review: Robertson, Characterization in the 
Conflict of Laws, 40 Col.L.Rev. 1461, 1471 footnote #40 (1940). · 
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To consider, as an illustration, a situation involving a series of pre-
liminary questions, let it be supposed that the forum, jurisdiction A, is the 
situs of personal property, to be administered at death. The forum holds 
that this is to be governed by the law of the domicile of the decedent, juris-
diction B. A question arises as to whether a claimant is legitimate, so as to 
be entitled to take. This turns upon the validity of a marriage performed in 
jurisdiction C. This depends upon the effect to be given to a divorce 
previously granted in jurisdiction D. Analyzing this situation, the question 
of legitimacy is a "preliminary" question to the determination of the "prin-
cipal" question whether the claimant is entitled to share in the estate. The 
validity of the marriage in jurisdiction C is a preliminary question to the 
determination of the question of legitimacy. The effect to be given to the 
divorce in jurisdiction D is a preliminary question to the determination of 
the validity of the marriage. This last ·preliminary question, upon which 
the case ultimately turns, is the latest problem to appear chronologically in 
the course of investigation into the case, but in the solution of the case it is 
logically the question which must be disposed of first. As the same is true 
in considering each of the other preliminary questions, in relation to their 
principal questions, respectively, it may be said that preliminary questions 
logically must be disposed of in the inverse order of their chronological 
appearance in the case. Each preliminary question may involve problems 
of characterization and localization. Under the doctrine, in each instance 
the conflict-of-laws rule to govern the preliminary question should be that 
of the jurisdiction governing the "principal" question, for the solution of 
which determination of the particular preliminary question is required. 
If the forum follows the conflict-of-laws rules of other jurisdictions in 
dealing with these questions, it is applying the renvoi doctrine. It will be 
recalled that that doctrine is to the effect that when the forum looks to the 
law of another jurisdiction, the forum will follow the conflict-of-laws rules 
of that jurisdiction, and it has been previously stated herein180 that in this 
country the doctrine is, in general, rejected, matters of property and status 
being exceptions to the rule of rejection in all countries in general rejecting 
the doctrine.181 The reason for the exceptions is the obvious fitness of 
governing matters of property by the rule of the situs and matters of status 
by the law of the domicile.182 The renvoi doctrine will be considered in 
detail in the following sections. It will be observed that, in the illustration, 
the basic "principal" question, who is to take the estate, is one of property, 
180See supra, at footnotes # #4-5; see, also, it~fra, §14. 
181These exceptions exist in all countries that reject the renvoi doctrine 
in general. See, also, infra, §14. 
182Jn this country, while the forum will follow the conflict-of-laws rule 
of the jurisdictio11 of situs or of domicile, that jurisdiction will not adopt the 
conflict-of-laws rule of any other (subject to very limited exceptions). See 
infra, §§9 & 14. With most foreign countries nationality must be substituted 
for domicile. 
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and each of the other questions is one of status. Therefore, when the pre-
liminary-question doctrine requires that these questions be determined by 
the conflict-of-laws rules of the situs or of the domicile, it amounts only to 
an application of the renvoi doctrine to them. Therefore, as the renvoi 
doctrine is everywhere applied to matters of property and of status, the 
illustration given, although it is used by writers upon the subject,133 and 
although it involves the sort of questions most commonly discussed in this 
connection, proves nothing, from the standpoint of establishing the utility 
of the preliminary-question doctrine. 
Robertson, who believes in the doctrine,134 and devotes a chapter to 
it, 185 cites only illustrations involving matters of property and of status, save 
in two instances, where he states that the situations are exceptions to the 
doctrine.136 It may be observed, further, that Robertson is wrong in treat-
ing the preliminary-question problem as one of characterization.137 The 
138It is used by Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 
152, and in Falconbridge, Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights, 17 Can. 
Bar Rev. 369, 377 (1939). 
134Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 141, 146, 156. 
The argument which he states in favor of the doctrine, at p. 140, is that used 
in favor of the renvoi doctrine generally, as he recognizes. Ibid. 156. The 
renvoi doctrine will be discussed infra, in the following section. 
135Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), c.VI, pp. 135-156. 
136Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 154. In one 
situation, the principal question is whether a tort has occurred through damage to 
property, and the preliminary question is whether the plaintiff had title to the 
property. .In the other, the principal question is whether the plaintiff is entitled to 
have restitution of money paid, and the preliminary question is whether the payment 
was made to satisfy a pre-existing obligation. These examples serve to illustrate a 
point that will be made in the text, how utterly mechanical is a rule based upon the 
circumstance that a problem happens to be presented to the court in the form of a 
preliminary question rather than in some other case as a principal question. Robert-
son refers to Wengler, German exponent of the preliminary-question doctrine, for 
further exceptions. Ibid., footnote #67, citing Die Vorfrage im Kollisionsrecht, 
(1934) Rabels Zeitschrift 148, 213-224. The present writer is indebted to the Uni-
versity of Chicago Libraries for furnishing in microfilm form, at nominal expense, 
the portion of Wengler referred to, and to Mr. Harry 0. Salinger, a senior student 
in the University of Southern California School of Law, for furnishing translation. 
Wengler's seventeen suggested exceptions do not throw any light upon the gen-
eral nature of the doctrine. Twelve relate to matters of status. Of the others, one 
is the first exception given by Robertson, S1tpra. The eighth in Wengler's list involves 
a situation where parties to a contract have different places of performance, and 
there is a doctrine of mutuality of performance, that is, that one party can be 
compelled to perform only if the other one can. Wengler seems to assume that the 
"principal" question is the enforceability of performance upon the part of whichever 
party happens to be defendant. The ninth is to the effect that where notice of 
defects under the law of sales "has been validly given under the law of the place 
of performance of the buyer, it must be recognized as valid at the place of per-
formance of the seller." Again it seems to be assumed that the seller will be the 
defendant, and that therefore his liability is the "principal" question. In the eleventh 
the "principal" question is whether a guarantor is liable, and the "preliminary" ques-
tion is whether he can secure indemnity from his principal, that being a pre-
requisite to the guarantor's liability. The twelfth is the same, except that the 
liability is that of joint debtors, and the "preliminary'' question is as to subrogation. 
It seems to be assumed that the liability of the particular debtor who is defendant 
will be the "principal" question. 
137He says that the "preliminary question" is a "special exemplification" of the 
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nature of the problems is not involved-it is simply a question whether or 
not the forum will make use of a connecting factor~ selected for it by 
another jurisdiction. Cases which might be thought to have applied the 
preliminary-question doctrine are entirely lacking in this country,l88 and 
almost so abroad,l39 and the present writer knows of none not involving 
matters of property or of status. 
It remains to be considered whether the preliminary-question doctrine 
has any possible validity, upon principle, as to matters other than those 
relating to property and to status.140 The strongest and best illustration in 
favor of such application of the doctrine which has occurred to the present 
writer,141 is where a defendant acting in one jurisdiction has inflicted injury 
in another,142 and a question arises as to whether or not he has acted under 
a privilege or a duty, the forum being a third jurisdiction. Here the 
"principal" question is whether or not there has been a tort, and the "pre-
liminary" question is whether or not a privilege or a duty has existed. It is 
obvious that application of the preliminary-question doctrine will never 
make any difference in the result unless the conflict-of-laws rule of the 
jurisdiction looked to upon the principal question is different from that of 
process of characterization. Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws 
(1940)' 156. 
lSBRobertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 151; Nussbaum, 
Review of ibid., 40 Col.L.Rev. 1461, 1471, footnote #40 (1940). 
139Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 149, uses In re 
Stirling [1908], 2 Ch. 344, involving inheritance turning upon legitimacy and a prior 
divorce, and, at 151, footnote #58, a German case of a similar nature, Oberlandes-
gericht Karlsruhe, March 20, 1931, 8 Jahrbuch fiir Entscheidungen der freiw. Ge-
richtsbarkeit 116 (1931), IPRspr. 184, in French Revue (1932) 702. A later German 
case, Reichsgericht II. Ziv. Sen., March 16, 1938, 67 Juristische Wochenschrift 1718 
(1938 No. 27), apparently failed to apply the doctrine. Robertson, ibid., 152 
footnote #60. A French case cited in the same note is possibly against the doc-
trine. Nussbaum, who is opposed to the doctrine, refers to French Court of 
Cassation, April 21, 1931, Journ.du Droit Int. 142 (1932), in connection with it. 
Review of Robertson: ibid., 40 Col.L.Rev. 1461, 1471, footnote #40 (1940). 
140Robertson says: "It seems . . . that the United States is not likely to 
be troubled with this particular problem, and we may confine our search to European 
cases." Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 151. He also says that 
the question "is not likely often to arise in cases outside family law." Ibid. 154. 
141For illustrations suggested by Professor Griswold's article, Renvoi Revisited, 
51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165 (1938), see infra, footnote #225. 
142For example, the defendant, acting as health officer in jurisdiction A, may 
have burned materials, the fumes damaging persons and property in jurisdiction B. 
Or the defendant, acting as a peace officer in jurisdiction A, may have shot at a 
fugitive under circumstances such that he would not have been privileged to do so 
in jurisdiction B, and his shot may have crossed the line and injured a person in 
the latter jurisdiction. 
It is elementary that a tort is considered to occur where the injury is inflicted, 
and that in general the forum will apply the domestic law of that jurisdiction. 
Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), §§377-379. The Restatement makes questions 
of privilege, duty and standards of care exceptions to the rule. Restatement, ibid., 
§§380, 382. As to criminal law, cf., in general, Stimson, Conflict of Criminal Laws 
(1936), esp. 46-57, 64-65&80-103. 
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the forum,143 and so we must assume that such is the case here.144 This 
will mean that, if the forum is to apply the doctrine, it will enter a judgment 
contrary to its own conceptions of justice, and different from what it would 
have entered if the question had been presented to it in some other form. 
An example of the latter would be a suit to enjoin the defendant. Can the 
forum reasonably be expected to do this? In the writer's opinion it can 
not.146 
The only argument which seems to have any weight in favor of asking 
the forum to enter such a judgment146 is that, if all jurisdictions would 
agree to do so, it would lead to certainty in that sort of case, that is, in any 
such case the parties would know that the conflict-of-laws rule of the juris-
diction where the injury occurred would be applied, regardless of what 
jurisdiction happened to be the forum. Of course they could not be certain 
that the problem involved would be presented in the form of a preliminary 
and not of a principal question, although the illustration suggested is very 
strong in that regard. While certainty in the field of conflict of laws is a 
desideratum of the utmost importance, it is not believed that in this instance 
the degree of certainty to be attained is sufficient to outweigh the forum's 
sense of justice. Certainty in the field of conflict of laws is largely a 
will-of-the-wisp until there is agreement upon principles of justice,l47 and 
here, by assumption, such agreement does not exist. It is purely a mechanis-
tic circumstance that the problem of privilege or of duty is presented to the 
forum as a preliminary question, and this will have no bearing upon· the 
forum's sense of justice.148 
In the field of conflict of laws, to state that if all courts would agree 
upon a proposition certainty would be achieved, really proves nothing, in 
143Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 149. De-
termination of what is the conflict-of-laws rule of that jurisdiction may involve the 
entire renvoi problem, treated in the remaining sections of this article. 
144For present purposes we are interested in the actual state of the law only 
from the standpoint of determining whether or not the illustration is entirely hypo-
thetical, which it is not unless agreement is clear. That it is not clear that such 
agreement exists, see Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 1938) 224, §91 ; Stumberg, 
Conflict of Laws (1937), 182 et seq. For the Restatement position, see Restatement, 
Conflict of Laws (1934), §382. Professor Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), does not 
have a section accompanying the Restatement section, but in vo1ume 2, p.1294, 
§380.1, he discusses rules and standards of care. The matter seems not to be 
discussed in Wharton, Conflict of Laws (3rd ed. 1905) ; see vol. 2, pp.l098 et seq., 
§478. 
145For a brief but trenchant criticism of the preliminary-question doctrine by 
Dr. Arthur Nussbaum, a well known Continental authority upon conflict of laws, 
now Research Professor of Public Law at Columbia University, see his review of 
Robertson; Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 40 Col.L.Rev. 1461, 1471, 
footnote #40 (1940). The disagreement of European writers in regard to the 
doctrine is discussed in Robertson, ibid., 140. 
14GAssuming that the forum does not follow the renvoi doctrine generally. 
Vllhether or not that should be done will be considered in detail in the following 
section. 
147Apart from matters of property and status, which stand apart in this field 
as a class by ·themselves, for the reason about to be outlined in the text. See infra, 
§§9-13; see, also, infra, §14. 
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making progress toward a solution of problems. Such a contention does not 
distinguish one proposition from any other in the entire field, where cer-
tainty has riot already been obtained.149 Every judge or other writer who 
has ever advanced a proposition in the field has hoped that the world would 
see the light and follow him. It is largely going around in a circle to say 
that so long as there is disagreement upon conflict-of-laws principles there 
will be problems of choice of conflict-of-laws principles. Stating the same 
thing conversely, agreement upon conflict-of-laws principles will end the 
necessity of making a choice of conflict-of-laws principles. But upon what 
~hall courts agree? It would be reasonable to ask them to agree, upon 
grounds of balancing the interests of individuals, or of other public policy, 
that in dealing with such a problem of privilege or of duty they will apply 
the domestic law150 of the place where the defendant acted, or that they 
will do the contrary, that is, that they \vill proceed from the standpoint of 
the injured party, and apply the domestic law of the place where the injury 
occurred. Agreement either way would lead all such cases to be decided the 
same way, as far as choice of conflict-of-laws principles is concerned. But it 
is not believed that any progress is going to be made by asking courts to 
adopt an accidentai mechanistic test which will only at times apply to a 
given problem, and which has no relation to the forum's sense of justice 
or to any considerations of public policy. 
We have seen that, in dealing with matters of property and of status, 
even in countries rejecting the renvoi doctrine in general, the forum will 
adopt the conflict-of-laws rules of the jurisdiction of situs or of domicile,m 
148Without going beyond matters of property and status, Dean Falconbridge has 
criticized the preliminary-question doctrine upon the ground of its mechanistic 
character. Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights, 17 Can.Bar Rev. 369, 377 
(1939). 
Two other considerations already noted, in connection with the discussion of 
primary characterization, sttpra, at footnotes ##30 & 37, could again be adverted to 
here: the additional burden placed upon the court of the forum in applying the 
conflict-of-laws rules of other jurisdictions, not to be assumed unless there is a 
compensating advantage; and the principle of integrity that a judge should apply 
the law to the best of his ability in accordance with the law of his own sovereignty, 
unless there is shown to be a sufficient reason for adopting the views of another. 
In connection with the "preliminary question" in particular, it may also be 
suggested that it is hard to imagine that there will be more than one controverted 
question of the sort in a single case, and it would be very difficult, where a matter 
of property or of status is not involved, to induce any judge, as the result of 
labored scholasticism, not to go directly to the heart of the problem in accordance 
with his own views of the conflict of laws. 
149The most notable examples of attained certaincy are the matters of property 
and of status already referred to. See also infra, §14. Many other principles are 
settled, such as that a tort is governed by the law of the place where it occurred, 
and cases involving only such questions do not present difficulties in connection 
with the choice of conflict-of-laws principles. 
150As before defined, the law applied by that jurisdiction when all the facts 
occurred within it. 
151S1tpra, at footnotes ##5 & 131-132. For detailed discussion, see irt/ra, 
§§9-13; see also i1r/ra, §14. With most foreign countries nationality must be su~ 
stituted for domicile. 
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but there the situation is very different. As to property matters relating to 
property situated elsewhere, and as to matters of status relating to persons 
domiciled elsewhere/52 the forum makes no attempt to apply its own prin-
ciples of justice-its only desire is to recognize the title to the property as 
it is at the situs, or the status as it is at the domicile.153 So in connection 
with such matters the forum's sense of justice is not shocked because the 
court decides the same question differently at different times-it is not a 
mere mechanical circumstance that the court is required to pass upon the 
titles to property situated in various jurisdictions, or upon the status of 
individuals \vith varying domiciles.154 Concluding our consideration of the 
"preliminary question," it is believed that the doctrine is unsound, and that 
it will not find a permanent place in any legal system. 
V. RENVOI 
1. (§6) THE PROBLEM 
The famous, insidious and baffling "renvoi" problem is this : When the 
forum looks to the law of another jurisdiction, does it do so for the foreign 
conflict-of-laws rule, or for the foreign domestic law? The domestic, or 
internal, law is that which a court of the foreign jurisdiction applies when 
all the facts are local to, that is, occurred within, that jurisdiction. What 
is known as the renvoi doctrine is that the forum shall follow the foreign 
conflict-of-laws rule. If the forum does so, the result may be an applica-
tion by the forum of the domestic law of the foreign jurisdiction, but this 
is after the renvoi problem has been solved. Having endeavored to become 
familiar with everything written in the English language upon renvoi, the 
present writer doubts whether it has been surpassed by any other topic in 
the law in the amount of material written upon it which, upon analysis, is 
seen to consist of nothing but dogmatic statement of the result desired to 
be reached.155 
"Renvoi" is the French word for "return".156 The doctrine received 
this name because the courts were troubled \vith this sort of case, the first 
152Qr, abroad, those having nationality elsewhere. 
153To be more exact, this is an imitative sense of justice upon the part of the 
forum in regard to these matters. See also infra, §14. 
154The French writer Maury has pointed out that there is a principle of 
uniformity of decisions in a national court as well as one of uniformity of inter-
national decisions. Regles Generales des Conflits de Lois (1936-III) Recueil des 
Cours 329, 561-562; discussed, Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws 
(1940), 140. The forum can be e.~pected to depart from the former principle only 
when, as with matters of property and of status, it is in harmony with its principles 
of justice to do so. See also infra, §14. 
155". . . The paper and ink devoted to the problem had already been so 
great a number of years ago that one author recorded in despair that 'Juristic 
speculation has been almost infinite.' " Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 
1165 (1938), quoting Note, A Distinction in the Renvoi Doctrine, 35 Harv.L.Rev. 
454 (1922). 
156Possibly "remit" is a better English equivalent. Note, 14 Law Quar.Rev. 
231, 232 (1898). 
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of which, the famous Forgo Case/57 arose in France in 1878. In that case, 
by the law of France, which was the forum of litigation and the situs of 
movables, succession was governed by the law of the nationality of the 
decedent, which was Bavarian. By the law of Bavaria, on the other hand, 
succession to movables was governed by the law of the situs, thus causing 
a "renvoi", or return, of the problem to the law of France. The court 
decided to "accept the renvoi," and apply the domestic law of the forum.1118 
The difficulty was that the courts found themselves in the throes of 
an apparently insoluble logical dilemma. If it was logical to do as a court 
of the foreign jurisdiction would, and therefore apply its conflict-of-laws 
rule to. look to the law of the forum, it was just as logical to again apply 
the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum looking to the foreign jurisdiction. 
Obviously, this process could be carried on ad infinitum without any result 
being reached. This dilemma has caused the problem to be referred to as 
international lawn-tennis, battledore and shuttlecock, ping-pong,1110 merry-
go-round, hide-and-seek, 160 logical cabinet of mirrors, cirwlus ine:rtricabilis, 
circle or endless chain of references, and in other ways.101 
A further difficulty arose when it was the conflict-of-laws rule of the 
foreign jurisdiction to refer the problem on to the law of a third jurisdic-
tion. This has sometimes been referred to as the problem of "transmission," 
to distinguish it from the problem of "remission", or return, to the law of 
157Administration des Domaines contra Ditch! et autres, Cour de Cassation, 
June 24, 1878, Dalloz Recueil de Jurisprudence, 1879 I. 56; Sircy, 1882 I. 393. This 
much discussed case laid the basis for the doctrine. Theoretical consideration of 
the problem commenced with an article by Labbe, Du Conflit entre Ia Loi Nationale 
du Juge Saisi et une Loi Etrangere Relativement a Ia Determination de Ia Loi 
Applicable a Ia Cause (1885), 12 Ounet 5. For an excellent brief statement of the 
case, see Cowan, Renvoi Does not Involve a Logical Fallacy, 87 Univ.Pa.L.Rev, 34, 
footnote #1 (1938). 
158In §19, i1~jra, will be discussed a variation of this solution of the problem 
under the renvoi, the difference not being material for purposes of the discussion 
in the present section. 
150The ping-pong theory is stated and discussed by Dean Fa!conbridge, an out-
standing writer in this field, Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights, 17 Can. 
Bar Rev. 369, 379 (1939). 
lOOAs a translation of the French 011 jtee cette fois a cache-cache. Bartin, 
Principles de Droit International Prive schon Ia loi et Ia Jurisprudence Franc;aises 
(Paris, 1930), translated, 169 Law Times 147, 148 (1930). Bartin commented: "It 
all ends, then, in this absurdity, that each of the two countries which eventually 
has jurisdiction applies to devolution the law which its own rules of conflict invite it 
to reject." Ibid. 
161Referring to reasoning which has been used in support of the renvoi doctrine, 
it has been termed the "foreign court theory" and the "acquired rights theory," 
Falconbridge, Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights, 17 Can.Bar Rev. 369, 
382 et seq. (1939). See infra, at footnotes ##175 & 182. 
The situation has also been referred to as an Alphonse and Gaston one, which 
will bring back memories to those who perused the comic strips of a generation 
ago. Following this simile, the position of the courts which follow the renvoi 
doctrine is like that of the excessively polite Frenchmen when both desired to enter a 
room, but neither could do so because of his insistence that the other should precede• 
him. Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1169 (1938). 
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the forum. Corresponding German terms are Riickverweismzg, for remis-
sion, and liV eiterverweisung, for transmission.162 
While "renvoi" is sometimes used, and the doctrine sometimes sup-
ported, in the narrow sense of "remission" to the law of the forum, 163 in 
general usage the term has become a generic one to refer to any problem of 
adoption by the forum of the conflict-of-laws rule of· another jurisdiction, 
and it is so used herein.164 In this sense, characterization, localization and 
the preliminary question are special variations of the general problem of 
renvoi. As a doctrine, to repeat, renvoi means that the forum will follow 
the conflict-of-laws rule of the foreign jurisdiction. Apparently the first 
reference in the English language to the renvoi doctrine is in the Law 
Quarterly Review, in 1898.165 
The situation which has given rise to most of the decisions in which 
the courts have been conscious of the renvoi problem is very similar to that 
in the original French case above mentioned. In this typical166 situation, 
l02Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws-Meaning of "The 
Law of a Country," 27 Yale L.Jour. 509, 518 (1918). 
163Professor Cowan, in a learned article upon the subject, uses the term 
renvoi only in the "remission" sense, devoting only a paragraph, just prior to his 
conclusions, to "transmission." Renvoi Does Not Involve a Logical Fallacy, 87 Univ. 
Pa.L.Rev. 34, 37, footnote ##15 & 48 (1938). 
Some foreign writers illogically support the renvoi doctrine with remission, but 
not with transmission. Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws-
Meaning of "The Law of a Country," 27 Yale L.Jour. 509, 518 (1918). This has 
been termed the "mutual disclaimer of jurisdiction theory," being to the effect 
that if the jurisdiction looked to by the forum declines jurisdiction, by holding 
that its domestic law does not apply, there is no law applicable to the subject, and 
the forum fills the gap by applying its own domestic law. Ibid. 512 et seq. 
Professor Lorenzen says that the distinction ''has no basis unless it be a desire to 
apply, wherever possible, the law of the forum. It is nothing else than a return 
pro ta11to to the doctrine of the exclusive prevalence of the internal law of the 
forum." Ibid. 520. Cowan, a supporter of the doctrine, expressly avoids the 
''mutual disclaimer" error. Cowan, ibid., 48. 
164Robertson, upon the basis of his illusozy "preliminary question" doctrine, 
objects in part to this practice. Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 97. 
Accord: Beckett, The Question of Oassification ("Qualification") in Private Inter-
national Law, 15 Brit.Y.B.Int.Law 46, 55, footnote #1 (1934). See also Robertson, 
ibid., 141-142. 
165N ote, 14 Law Quar.Rev. 231 (1898). The writer states that the principle 
had been known, but not the name. The word "renvoi" first appeared in a judicial 
opinion in the English language in In re Johnson [1903] 1 Ch. 821, 831. For an 
excellent historical survey by Professor Lorenzen in 1910, see The Renvoi Theory 
and the Application of Foreign Law, 10 Col.L.Rev. 190 & 327 (1910). At p. 19, 
footnote #24, he includes a bibliography of foreign materials. Neither Story, 
Wharton nor Minor referred to the doctrine. Story, Conflict of Laws (8th ed. 1883) ; 
Wharton, Conflict of Laws (3rd ed. 1905) ; Minor, Conflict of Law (2d ed. 1901). 
Minor did make the obscure statement that "the strict letter of the lex domicilii of 
the testator at the time of his death will conrol, and no foreign law can be 
incorporated into it for the purpose of any particular case." Minor, ibid., 334; 
quoted, Bates, Remission and Transmission in American Conflict of Laws, 16 Com. 
L.Quar. 311, 317 (1931). 
166Falconbridge, Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights, 17 Can.Bar 
Rev. 369, 389 (1939) ; Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of 
Foreign Law, 10 ColL.Rev. 190, 193 (1910). 
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the forum is disposing at death of personal property of which the forum is 
the situs. The decedent was a citizen of the forum, with domicile else-
where. Under the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum, the disposition of the 
property is governed by the law of the domicile of the decedent, but under 
the rule of the jurisdiction of domicile it is governed by the law of the 
jurisdiction of nationality, which is the forum.167 
2. ( §7) ARGUMENTS FOR AND AG~INST DOCTRINE 
Perhaps the chief reason why the renvoi problem has proved so baffling 
is that those who have devoted thought to it have been groping for an in-
crease in certainty in the field of conflict of laws through its adoption or 
rejection.168 Apart from the special situations discussed elsewhere,l60 this is 
a vain hope. To make this clear, let us consider as an example the simple, 
common and important situation referred to at the beginning of this paper. 
The forum, jurisdiction A, it will be remembered, has presented to it a 
question relating to the validity of a contract executed in jurisdiction B, 
and to be performed in jurisdiction C. It is the conflict-of-laws rule of the 
forum, jurisdiction A, that the validity of a contract is governed by the law 
of the place of execution, jurisdiction B; but it is the rule of jurisdiction B 
that all matters relating to contracts are governed by the law of the place 
of performance, jurisdiction C. Let us add the factor that the conflict-of-
laws rule of jurisdiction C is the same as that of jurisdiction A, that the 
validity of a contract is governed by the law of the place of execution. 
This will cause jurisdiction C to look back to the law of jurisdiction B.170 
167This situation is the only one given in the Restatement as an illustration in 
connection with the general American rule of rejection of the renvoi doctrine. Re-
statement, Conflict of Laws (1934), §7, Illustration 1. It is given as the typical 
example by Professor Griswold at the beginning of his excellent article, Renvoi 
Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1166 (1938). See also 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws 
(1935), 56, §7.3. 
A similar situation arises when there is international disagreement as to 
whether the law to govern a problem is to be selected upon a territorial or a personal 
basis. Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 98 et seq., 229 et 
seq. 
168Professor Griswold contemporarily argues that " 'rejecting the renvoi' leads 
to uncertainty and contradiction in a manner which should give its proponents pause." 
Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1180 (1938). However, he excepts from 
his argument in favor of adoption of the renvoi doctrine "the few cases where this 
step would lead to the insoluble difficulty of the endless chain." Ibid. 1183. The 
illustration about to be given in the text herein is therefore outside the scope of 
his argument, as he expressly recognizes. Ibid. 1192. 
Professor Lorenzen, opposing the renvoi doctrine, says: "Its introduction into 
our law would be most unfortunate on account of the uncertainty and confusion 
to which it would give rise in the administration of justice and its demoralizing 
effect upon the future development of the Conflict of Laws." The Renvoi Theory 
and the Application of Foreign Law, 10 Col.L.Rev. 190 & 327, 344 (1910). Sec 
Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (2d ed.' 1938), 13. 
160The mechanistic possibility of greater certainty in connection with the pre-
liminary-question doctrine, in case a problem happens to be presented in that form, 
has been discussed in the preceding section. Matters of status and of property, 
as previously indicated, stand out in the field of conflict of laws, and will be 
discussed in §§9-13, infra. See also §14, infra. 
170This gives us a "circle," from B to C and back to B. It will be recalled 
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If the renvoi doctrine is rejected, that is, if the forum does not follow 
the conflict-of-laws rules of other jurisdictions, the court of jurisdiction A 
will apply the domestic law of jurisdiction B, and the conflict-of-laws rules 
of jurisdictions B and C will be irrelevant. On the other hand, if the 
forum, rejecting the renvoi, happens to be a jurisdiction which has the 
rule that validity of a contract is governed by the law of the place of per-
formance, it will apply the domestic law of jurisdiction C, and again the 
conflict-of-laws rules of jurisdictions B and C will be irrelevant. In either 
instance, the outcome of the case depends upon the accidental circumstance 
that the forum happens to be a jurisdiction holding one or the other of the 
two views mentioned. This is clearly undesirable. Let us therefore see 
whether the situation is improved through adoption of the doctrine of the 
renvoi. 
We shall consider the same illustration from the standpoint of the 
various possibilities under an application by the forum of the renvoi doc-
trine. Returning to the first supposition previously made as to the view of 
jurisdiction A, that its conflict-of-laws rule is that validity of a contract is 
governed by the law of the place of execution, jurisdiction B, the court of 
the forum will, under the renvoi doctrine, look to the law of jurisdiction B 
in the first instance. But the forum will look to jurisdiction B for its con-
flict-of-laws rule, and, finding that that rule is to look to the law of juris-
diction C, the forum will do likewise. Again the forum will look for the 
conflict-of-laws rule of the jurisdiction referred to, now jurisdiction C and, 
finding that that rule is to refer the matter back to jurisdiction B, the forum 
again will follow suit. Having previously looked to the law of jurisdiction 
B, as the first step in its search for a governing law, the forum has now 
completed a circle from B to C and back to B, and so finds itself in the 
logically insoluble dilemma which has been described. Therefore the forum 
will "accept the reference" back to the law of B}71 and apply the domestic 
law of that jurisdiction. 
Now, still under the renvoi doctrine, let us take the other suggested 
supposition as to the conflict-of-laws rule of jurisdiction A, that is, that it 
holds that validity of a contract is governed by the law of the place of per-
that it was this type of situation which first directed attention to the renvoi prob-
lem. Professor Griswold objects: ". . . By approaching the matter from the 
abstract and theoretical point of view, the fear of the endless chain has been 
magnified into a generalization; while the endless chain is in fact and in practice 
an extremely rare apparition." Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1192 ( 1938). 
The reader will have to judge whether or not the illustration being considered is far 
fetched. To the present writer it seems that the best way to understand the renvoi 
problem, and to appreciate its fu11 implications, is to approach it primarily from the 
standpoint of the "circle" situation. That aspect is ably discussed incidentally by 
Professor Griswold. Ibid. It is true, as pointed out by Griswold, that even though 
a jurisdiction adopts the principle of the renvoi doctrine, there are a number of 
types of situations where the "circle" difficulty will not arise. Ibid. 1183, 1188-1192. 
These situations will be discussed in the course of the present paper. 
171See footnote #158, st~Pra. 
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fonnance, jurisdiction C. The course of the forum's search will now be 
from C to B, and back to C, when, again having completed a circle, it will 
"accept the reference," and apply the domestic law of jurisdiction C. So we 
see that, whether the renvoi doctrine be accepted or rejected, the outcome 
depends upon the accident of the view held by the jurisdiction which hap-
pens to become the forum for litigation. As Professor Lorenzen, after 
discussing a different illustration172 of the same point, said: 
"Renvoi or no renvoi, such inconsistencies will remain. Uniformity 
of decision cannot be obtained until the elimination of the differ-
ences in the systems of Private International Law178 through inter-
national agreement."174 
The various arguments, apart from certainty, in favor of the renvoi 
doctrine as a general principle, may be briefly stated as follows, arranged in 
order of decreasing weight which the present writer feels that they have had: 
(1) The foreign court theory. This is that, when the forum looks to 
the law of another jurisdiction, it should do as a court of that jurisdiction 
would.175 The adoption of this theory is a natural reaction in dealing with 
this type of case, and, as pointed out, was the original reaction of the courts. 
Even when not expressed, it has been felt and applied unconsciously. This 
theory is relied upon more than any other by the distinguished contemporary 
advocate of the doctrine, Professor Griswold of the Harvard Law School. He 
quotes Mr. Justice Jenner, in a decision of a century ago: 
"The Court sitting here decides from the evidence of persons skilled 
in that [foreign] law, and decides as it would if sitting in 
Belgium."176 
For his own reasoning, Professor Griswold says: 
"It is . . . the thesis of this article that domestic courts referred 
abroad should not blind themselves to foreigu rules of conflict of 
laws. They should instead, as a matter of course, look first at the 
'whole law' of the other state, and undertake to dispose of the case 
as the foreign court would dispose of it; and if the foreign court 
would in its disposition apply some rule of conflict of laws the 
172J'he situation referred to by Professor Lorenzen was discussed in the text, 
supra, at footnote #1M. 
178In 1910 Professor Lorenzen was using this Continental term to refer to 
conflict of laws. 
174Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law, 10 
Col.L.Rev. 190, 206 (1910). Insofar as alternative rules to validate legal transactions 
are worked out and applied, such uncertainties are avoided, a very desirable result. 
A familiar example of this is the provision of the Uniform Wills Act that a will 
of personal property is valid if executed in accordance with either the law of the 
domicile or that of the place of execution. Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Executed, 
§1 ; Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws-Meaning of "The 
Law of a Country," 27 Yale L.Jour. 509, 531 (1918). The range of such pos-
sibilities would seem to be limited. 
175Falconbridge, Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights, 17 Can.Bar 
Rev. 369, 382 (1939) ; Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1168, 1182 
(1938). 
176Collier v. Rivaz, 2 Curteis 855, 863 (Ecc. Ct. 1841). 
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domestic court should do the same. There will be a few cases 
which will not lend themselves to this approach, but it is believed 
that these will in fact be rare and that they can be handled as and 
when they arise."177 
255 
(2) Disclaimer, or nmtual disclaimer, of jurisdiction. This theory is to 
the effect that if it is not the conflict-of-laws rule of the jurisdiction looked 
to by the forum to apply its own domestic law, the foreign State disclaims 
jurisdiction, and that then there is no objection to the forum's applying its 
own domestic law, which it does.l78 The theory is sometimes referred to as 
one of mutual disclaimer, with the thought that the forum disclaimed juris-
diction when it looked to the foreign law in the first instance.179 The dis-
claimer theory applies whether the foreign jurisdiction looked to by the 
forum refers the matter back to the forum or on to the law of a third juris-
diction.1B0 The theory therefore results in applying the domestic law of the 
forum whenever the conflict-of-laws rule of the jurisdiction looked to by the 
forum is different from its own.1B1 
(3) Vested, acquired, or foreign-created rights. This theory is to the 
effect that, in a conflict-of-laws case, the forum is enforcing rights created 
elsewhere, and that the conflict-of-laws rules of the foreign jurisdiction should 
be included as one aspect of those rights.182 Professor Griswold asks : 
''Without any thought that there is anything inevitable or logically 
necessary about the process, is it not true that the enforcement here 
of rights which would be recognized abroad is ordinarily sound con-
flict of laws ?"188 
( 4) Desistement, or gap. This theory is that if it is not the confiict-of-
laws rule of the jurisdiction looked to by the forum to apply the domestic 
low of such foreign jurisdiction, there is a hiatus in the law, which the forum 
fills with its own domestic law.184 While the present writer feels that 
177Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1182 (1938). It should be 
remembered that Professor Griswold's attention is primarily directed to situations 
which the present writer feels should be treated as exceptions to the general 
American rule of rejection of the renvoi. ~ 
178Falconbridge, Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights, 17 Can.Bar 
Rev. 369, 380 (1939); Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws-
Meaning of "The Law of a Country," 27 Yale L.Jour. 509, 512 et seq., 524 et seq. 
(1918). 
170The older generation will recognize this as an "Alphonse and Gaston" 
approach. See supra, footnote #161. 
lSOLorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws-Meaning of "The 
Law of a Country," 27 Yale L.Jour. 509, 515, 524 (1918). 
lSl.This theory, first developed by the German von Bar, has been much more 
influential abroad than in this country. See Lorensen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the 
Conflict of Laws-Meaning of "The Law of a Country," 27 Yale L.Jour. 509, 512 
(1918). 
182Falconbridge, Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights, 17 Can.Bar Rev. 
369, 386 (1939); Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1186 (1938); de 
Sloovere, The Local Law Theory and Its Implications in the Conflict of Laws, 
41 Harv.L.Rev. 421, 424 (1928). 
188Renvoi Revisited, 51 HarvL.Rev. 1165, 1186 (1938). 
184Bate, Notes on the Doctrine of Renvoi in Private International Law (1904), 
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this theory as used in the present connection is unsound, it has a proper use 
for a different purpose, which will be discussed later.185 Professor Griswold 
says: 
"It is somewhat as if our law had referred us to the law of an area 
which has no law. In such a case there might be reason for dispos-
ing of the case according to our own internal law, in default of any 
other law which will settle the question. This is the solution 
adopted by the common law in the situation where a conflicts rule 
refers to the law of a foreign state and there is a failure to prove 
what that law is. There is here in effect a failure or inability to 
prove how the foreign court would dispose of the case. The law is 
full of such arbitrary dispositions where there is no other per-
suasive basis for settling the issue. Since this is really a case where 
the conflicts rule is in fact ineffective, the legislature might well 
provide by, statute that the court should dispose of the case by 
applying its own internal law."186 
(5) Effectiveness of reference to foreign law. Robertson suggests, in 
favor of the renvoi doctrine: 
". . . This is the only way of respecting the determination 
already made that the selected proper law is to govern the question 
in dispute."187 
(6) The territorial theory. This theory is to the effect that all con-
flict-of-laws problems should be approached from the standpoint of a basic 
principle that every act is to be governed by the law of the place where it 
occurred. While Professor Beale, the revered leader of the "territorial" 
school, disagrees,188 others have pointed out that the logic of the position is 
in favor of the renvoi doctrine.1so 
(7) Reconciliation of contradictory principles. Professor Cowan, mak-
ing a highly theoretical approach, contends: 
" It [the renvoi doctrine] reconciles two contradictory 
313; Falconbridge, Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights, 17 Can.Bar 
Rev. 369, 380 (1939) ; Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1168, 1193 
(1938). 
lBGSee §17, infra. 
lBGGriswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1193 (1938). On the pre-
ceding page he says: "This is not desistement; it is rather the recognition of a fact." 
1B7Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 156. While he is 
here directing his attention primarily to the "preliminary question," he refers to 
the argument as "that given elsewhere for the application of the renvoi," and at 
103, 140, indicates that he believes in the renvoi doctrine in general. 
lBBBeale, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1916), 77, §58, reprinted 3 Beale, 
Conflict of Laws (1935), 1939; quoted, Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 
1165, 1187, footnote #70 (1938). 
lBO"Mr. Beale's argument against renvoi seems very difficult to reconcile with 
his vested rights approach. . . . Dicey alone seems to have been consistent 
here." Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1187, footnote #70 (1938). 
To the same effect: Falconbridge, Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights, 
17 Can.Bar Rev. 369, 387 (1939). It should be noted that, under the territorial 
theory, foreign acts create vested rights, to be enforced by the forum. There 
are thus only differences of approach and of emphasis between the "vested rights" 
and the "territorial" theories. The "vested rights" theory may> be said to be an 
application of the "territorial" theory. 
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principles of decision. The one is the conflict of laws rule which 
directs the court under certain general circumstances to apply for-
eign law. The other is the intuitive conviction of the judge that 
in the special circumstances of the renvoi case before him the ends 
of justice will be served just as well, if not better, by the application 
of the familiar law of the forum rather than the unfamiliar law of 
a foreign jurisdiction. Whether legitimate or not, renvoi is a 
device which permits both of these contradictory needs to be 
satisfied. "190 
257 
To the present writer's mind, these theories all leave unanswered the 
difficult basic question. Why should the court of the forum so regard the 
problem? 
Recognizing the difficulty of the task, and benefiting by the efforts of 
those who have written upon the subject previously, the present writer will 
endeavor to state why he believes that the renvoi doctrine, as a general 
principle, should be rejected, the reasons being arranged in order of de-
creasing importance. 
(1) Economy of effort. The difficulties of judges and attorneys are 
increased when it becomes necessary for them to apply the law of a foreign 
jurisdiction. As to the foreign domestic law, the demands of justice in 
conflict-of-laws cases require this, assuming that the relevant facts have not 
occurred within the jurisdiction of the forum. As to the foreign conflict-of-
laws rules, this task is avoided if the renvoi doctrine is rejected. This seems 
to be a sound reason for rejection of the renvoi doctrine, unless a sufficient 
consideration to the contrary can be found.191 Dean Falconbridge, of the 
Osgoode Hall Law School, of Toronto, a distinguished writer, says: 
". . . Practical, if not theoretical, considerations lead to the con-
clusion that, as a general rule, a court should not have to concern 
itself \vith the conflict rules of the proper law selected by it accord-
ing to its own conflict rules. The burden, sometimes heavy, some-
190Cowan, Renvoi Does Not Involve a Logical Fallacy, 87 Univ.Pa.L.Rev. 34 
(1938). Professor Cowan emphasizes that, in the article quoted, he is not taking a 
position either way in regard to the value of the renvoi doctrine for the solution of 
controversies, but is merely attempting to show that logical objections to it are 
not valid. Ibid. 36, 49. 
Professor Cowan contends that the renvoi doctrine does not involve a logical 
fallacy, or the possibility of a "vicious circle,'' because when the foreign juris-
diction refers the matter back to the forum, the reference must be taken to mean 
that it is to the domestic law of the forum. Ibid. 47-49. As has been aptly 
pointed out by Professor Griswold, while tl1e reference back by the foreign juris-
diction may be so regarded, no reason is apparent why it m11st be. If the law of 
the forum applicable to the case in the first instance includes its conflict-of-laws 
rules, which lead the forum to the law of the foreign jurisdiction, and if the 
applicable law of the foreign jurisdiction includes its conflict-of-laws rules, which 
refer the matter back to the law of the forum, it is hard to see why the reference 
back should not also be regarded as being to the entire law of the forum, including 
its conflict-of-laws rules. Professor Griswold points out that Mr. Cowan assigns 
two different meanings to the "law of the forum." Griswold, In Reply to Mr. 
Cowan's Views on Renvoi, 87 Univ.Pa.L.Rev. 257, 258-260 (1939). 
191See S1tpra, at footnote #30, for the same thought in connection with 
characterization. "There are no practical advantages to be gained from the adoption 
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times almost insuperable, of ascertaining and applying foreign con-
flict rules should not, as a purely practical matter, be imposed on a 
court unless it appears, or is made to appear by one of the litigants, 
that the situation is an exceptional one in which consideration of the 
conflict rules of the proper law is required or justified on more or 
less practical or theoretical grounds or on the basis of policy in 
order to reach a just result."192 
(2) Integrity of judge of forum. It is a basic principle of integrity, in 
the fulfillment of functions as a judge as well as in all other activities of 
life, that a person should act in accordance with his own judgment unless 
there is a sufficient reason for preferring that of another.193 This principle 
is an important one in the development of strength of personality. It can, 
of course, easily be overdone in application. 
(3) The local theory. The "local" school of thought is so named to 
distinguish it from the "territorial" school, already referred to.194 Adherents 
of the latter school, it will be recalled, feel that all conflict-of-laws problems 
should be approached from the standpoint of a general principle that every 
act is governed by the law qf the place where it occurred; and it has been 
pointed out that the logic of this position is in favor of the renvoi doctrine.101i 
Members of the "local" school, among whom the present writer counts him-
self, will ordinarily reach results in harmony with application of the terri-
torial principle, but feel that conflict-of-laws problems, like all others, should 
be approached purely from the standpoint of pragmatic considerations deriv-
ing from the necessities of the particular situation. This makes it easier 
for them to act in accordance with the arguments against the renvoi doctrine 
which have just been advanced.106 
Other arguments which have been advanced against the renvoi doctrine, 
apart from the question of certainty, but which have failed to carry convic-
of the renvoi doctrine." Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws-
Meaning of "The Law of a Country," 27 Yale L.Jour. 509, 523 (1918). Professor 
Griswold states, in regard to the "endless chain'' situation: "No disposition can be 
made of the question which is not purely arbitrary. There is no more reason 
for 'rejecting the renvoi' than for 'accepting' it." Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 
Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1192 (1938). He modestly overlooks the fact that on the fol-
lowing page he presents the argument set forth in the text of the present article. 
At another point, in connection with the same thought, of lessening the effort 
required of the court of the forum, Mr. Griswold points out that it should not be 
regarded as conclusive. Ibid. 1179. This is, of course, true, when sufficient reason 
to the contrary can be found. Professor Lorenzen also makes the point set forth 
in the text. The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law, 10 Col.L.Rev. 
190, 206 (1910). 
1D2Falconbridge,. Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights, 17 Can.Bar 
Rev. 369, 395 (1939). 
1D3See sztpra, at footnote #37, for the same thought in connection with 
characterization. 
lD4Supra, at footnote #188. 
1D5Supra, at footnote #189. 
1D6While there has been much discussion as to whether the forum, if it applies 
rules of foreign law to the case before it, receives the foreign law as matter of 
law or of fact, such discussion seems fruitless in the present connection. 
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tion to the mind of the present writer, in most instances because they seem 
to assume the point at issue, may be briefly stated as follows : 
( 4) Obstacle to progress of the law. Professor Lorenzen has said: 
"The general recognition of the renvoi doctrine . . . would be 
fatal to the harmonious development of the rules of the conflict of 
laws in the future. No proper system of the conflict of laws can 
be built up among the civilized nations as long as this doctrine 
remains."197 
( 5) Public policy of the forum. Professor Lorenzen has said: 
"The moment it is granted that the adoption of the rules of the con-
flict of laws rests upon considerations of justice, expedience, and 
policy, it follows that each state must exercise its own judgment 
in the matter and determine the matter finally. This it fails to do 
when it adopts the theory of renvoi proper in its wider sense."198 
"A mere statement of the operation of the 'renvoi' doctrine should 
be sufficient to condemn it. The policy which guides our courts 
when they apply the law of domicile, the law of the contract, or any 
other rule of the conflict of laws, must manifestly be determined by 
our own law and cannot reasonably be left to the judgment of a 
foreign legislator."199 
(6) Abdication of sovereignty. 
"Many writers have argued that the acceptance of the renvoi doc-
trine amounts to an abdication on the part of one sovereign in favor 
of another."200 
(7) Subversion of law of forum.201 
(8) Stultification of law of forum. 
"Another grave objection to the English attitude [in favor of the 
renvoi] is that it tends to stultify English private international law. 
The result is that whenever English private international 
197Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws-Meaning of "The Law 
of a Country,'' 27.Yale L.Jour. 509, 528 (1918). The views of Professor Lorenzen, 
who has rendered great service in this field, are discussed in Griswold, Renvoi Re-
visited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1170 (1938). 
198Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Confiict of Laws-Meaning of ''The 
Law of a Country,'' 27 Yale L.Jour. 509, 522 (1918). 
199E. G. L[orenzen], Renvoi in Divorce Proceedings Based upon Constructive 
Service, 31 Yale L.Jour. 191, 192 (1921). 
200Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws-Meaning of ''The 
Law of a Country," 27 Yale L.Jour. 509, 522 (1918). Bentwich is quoted, and the 
matter discussed, ibid. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy replies: "It is not outside the 
province of a sovereign to allocate every possible legal relationship wherever situated 
to one of the jurisdictions of the world, if in doing so he is aware of the law of 
reciprocity and does not claim to do it othenvise than for the benefit of complete justice dispensed by his own courts to the persons who may seek their protection." 
Renvoi in Modern English Law (1937), 85. 
201Cheshire holds that the renvoi doctrine is "subversive," and "flouts" the law 
of the forum. Private International Law (2d ed. 1938), 57, 59. Professor Griswold 
discusses and replies to Dr. Cheshire's views, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 
1177 (1938). Cheshire has been quoted herein in regard to this. Footnote #37, 
supra. 
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law differs from that of a country to which it refers a question in-
volving a foreign element, the English courts surrender their own 
criterion in favour of that of the foreign country. The formula 
'Decide the case as it would be decided by the courts of the foreign 
country' seems to involve the result that whenever a difference 
exists between the English and foreign private international law it 
must be resolved by applying the foreign system. 'The English 
court repudiates its rules directly a foreign judge is pleased to be 
displeased with them, and· a foreign law which is called as a wit-
ness is allowed to sit as a Court of Appeal.' [Bate, Notes on 
the Doctrine of Renvoi, p. 114.] If this is really the attitude of 
English law, it may well be wondered why we have a system of 
private international law at all; for, to adapt the Abbe Sieyes's 
celebrated remark about Second Chambers,202 if our rule disagrees 
with the foreign rule it is mischievous, and if it agrees with it it is 
unnecessary."203 
(9) Lack of logic. 
"It [the renvoi doctrine] is illogical, because it defeats the purpose 
which a national system of Private International Law is designed to 
effect, i. e. to indicate the mode in which a conflict of laws must be 
solved."204 
Anglo-American opinion is overwhelmingly against the renvoi doc-
trine.205 Foreign writers206 and courts207 are divided. While much has 
been written to prove that it is the English law that the renvoi doctrine is 
rejected, the situation is still not clear.208 
202Such as the English House of Lords. 
203Morris, The Law of the Domicile, 18 Brit.Y.B.Int.Law 32, 35 (1937). 
204Cheshire, Private International Law (2d ed. 1938), 57; quoted and discussed, 
Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1176 (1938). Dean Falconbridge 
considers the doctrine "intrinsically illogical." Renvoi and Succession to Movables, 
46 Law Quar.Rev. 485 (1930); 47 ibid. 271, 291 (1931), quoted Griswold, ibid., 1173. 
Professor Lorenzen agrees with Mendelssohn-Bartholdy that the doctrine is il-
logical. Lorenzen, Review of Mendelssohn-Bartholdy: Renvoi in Modern English 
Law, 47 Yale L.Jour. 857, 859 (1938). 
205An excellent discussion is presented in Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv. 
L.Rev. 1165, 1170 et seq. (1938). 
206A bibliography is appended, at p.531, to Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in 
the Conflict of Laws-Meaning of "The Law of a Country," 27 Yale L.Jour. 509 
(1918). See also: Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign 
Law, 10 Col.L.Rev. 190, 194, footnote #24 (1910) ; Emil Potu, La Question du 
Renvoi en droit international prive (Paris, 1913). 
207Cf. Kuhn, Comparative Commentaries on Private International Law (1937), 
53; Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law, 10 Col.L.Rev. 
190, 191 et seq. & 327 et seq. (1910) ; Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Con-
flict of Laws-Meaning of "The Law of a Country," 27 Yale L.Jour. 509, 520, 522 
(1918). As to French law, see Falcon bridge, Renvoi and Succession to Movables, 
46 Law Quar.Rev. 485 (1930); 47 ibid. 271, 277 (1931). 
208The latest case is Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. [1939] 
A.C. 277, noted, 40 Col.L.Rev. 518 (1940). For an excellent comment upon the 
difficulty of interpreting the English decisions, see Lorenzen, Review of Men-
delssohn-Bartholdy: Renvoi in Modern English Law, 47 Yale L. Jour. 857 (1938). 
1941] CONFLICT OF LAWS 
3. SITUATION UNDER AMERICAN AND OTHER REJECTION OF RENVOI 
A. (§8) General Rttle of Rejection 
261 
In view of the paucity of case materials consciously dealing with the 
renvoi problem, possibly the future tense rather than the present should be 
used in speaking of the state of the law. While dealing with rejection of 
the renvoi doctrine, our attention will be focused upon situations involving 
only American States, but it is believed that the statements made will be 
equally applicable to any situation involving foreign countries all of whom 
"reject the renvoi" as a general rule. Bearing in mind the fact that the courts 
very seldom have had their attention directed to renvoi potentialities, the 
entire body of Anglo-American decisions in conflict-of-laws cases is evidence 
that it has been the practice of the courts to apply the domestic law of the 
jurisdiction selected by the forum as the proper one to govern the case, with-
out inquiring into the conflict-of-laws rules of that jurisdiction.209 For the 
reasons stated in the preceding section, it is believed that they should con-
tinue that practice, and it is felt that they will do so. Situations which may 
be thought to give difficulty will be considered in the following section, as 
will ~rofessor Griswold's contention that support for the renvoi doctrine can 
be found in the present state of the American law. 
In addition to the overwhelming weight of Anglo-American scholarly 
legal opinion, it has been indicated more directly that the courts are not 
going to depart from their settled practice upon having their attention 
directed to the renvoi doctrine. The much discussed case of In re Tall-
madge,210 in an inferior New York court, presented the typical situation 
mentioned which has been largely responsible for directing attention to the 
renvoi problem throughout the world, an estate of local personal property of 
a decedent domiciled elsewhere. Mr. Referee Winthrop, in a scholarly211 
opinion, said: 
". . . I am of the opinion that the 'renvoi' is no part of New 
York law. . . . To state accurately the problem in regard to 
the 'renvoi' would seem almost sufficient to refute the doc-
trine. . . . 
"The 'renvoi' doctrine is not supported by reason. It incon-
sistently requires either the application of internal New York law 
after the reference by the French law, although the first reference 
had been from New York to the French conflict of laws rule, or 
209An English writer says: "Nor must we forget that for every case which lends 
the [renvoi] doctrine some support there are hundreds in which the municipal 
law of the foreign country was automatically applied." Morris, The Law of the 
Domicile, 18 Brit.Y.B. Int.Law 32, 39 (1937). Cheshire refers to "myriads of de-
cisions" where it has been assumed that the foreign law meant simply the do-
mestic law. Private International Law (2d ed. 1938), 66. · 
210109 Misc. 696, 181 N.Y.S. 336 (1909), discussed, Griswold, Renvoi Re-
visited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1204 (1938). 
211Jt has been said that the "confused" referee, "in a most learned and most 
objectionable way, rejected the ren"l!oi." Nussbaum, Review of Robertson: Characteri-
zation in the Conflict of Laws, 40 Col.L.Rev. 1461, 1472 (1940). 
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the endless reference back and forth, which has been called a circu-
lus inextricabilis. 
"It has been argued that the New York court should constitute 
itself a French court; the assumption being that it is charged with 
the administration and enforcement of French law in the same man-
ner as a French court is charged. But this assumption is erroneous. 
The· New York court was created and exists for the purpose of en-
forcing the New York law, including the state's own rules as to the 
conflict of laws."212 
The Restatement is against the renvoi doctrine: 
"Except as stated in §8 [title to land and divorce], when there is 
a difference in the Conflict of Laws of two states whose laws are 
involved in a problem, the rule of Conflict of Laws of the forum is 
applied; 
"(a) 
"(b) 
[characterization] . , 
where in making the choice of law to govern a certain 
situation the law of another state is to be applied, since 
the only Conflict of Laws used in the determination of 
the case is the Conflict of Laws of the forum, the foreign 
law to be applied is the law applicable to the matter in 
hand and not the Conflict of Laws of the foreign 
state."213 
B. Property and Status 
a. (§9) General Situation as Exceptions 
It will be recalled that in the discussion of the "preliminary question"214 
it has been pointed out why matters of property and of status stand out in 
a class by themselves in the field of conflict of laws. To repeat, it has been 
recognized throughout the world as peculiarly fitting that matters of property 
should be governed by the law of the situs, and matters of status by the 
law of the domicile.215 As to them a forum which is not itself the situs or 
212Jn re Tallmadge, 109 Misc. 696, 181 U.Y.S. 336, 345-346 (1909). 
In University of Chicago v. Dater, 277 Mich. 658, 270 N.W.174 (1936), which has 
attracted a great deal of attention, the Michigan court permitted the Illinois con-
flict-of-laws rule to govern the contractual capacity of a Michigan married woman, 
under an alternative assumption that, according to Michigan conflict-of-laws rules, 
the matter was governed by Illinois law. The opinion does not refer to the renvoi 
doctrine, although a dissenting judge refers to the doctrine of qualifications 
[characterization], directing his attention to what is here termed localization. 
Professor Griswold approves the result reached by the majority of the court. 
Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1207-1208 (1938). 
213Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), §7. 
214S1tPra, at footnotes ##132 & 152-154; see, also, i1~jra, §14. 
2151 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), 57, §8.1: "Because of the paramount 
social importance of treating the existence of marriage, for instance, in the same 
way in all states, the law of the forum attempts to bring abo~t a warranty of 
such treatment by providing in its law for a decision of the question in the way 
that the law. which in its opinion is the proper law would determine it; not be-
cause of any effect given to that law but simply as the rule adopted by the law of 
the forum for the determination of such problems. The same argument applies to 
a determination of the title of foreign land; it being essential to the protection of 
the interests of all parties that such a title should be determined everywhere as 
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the domicile216 makes no attempt to apply its own principles of justice-its 
only desire is to recognize the title to the property as it is at the situs,217 or 
the status as it is at the domicile. Not only does this accord with the 
forum's senses of justice and of fitness, but it would be singularly ineffective 
for the forum, in the relatively few cases218 in which matters relating to for-
eign property or status are presented to it, to attempt to apply a different 
rule from that existing at the situs or the domicile. Any such attempt 
would evidence a remarkably narrow public policy upon the part of the 
forum.219 
In keeping with this line of thought, the forum will follow the conflict-
of-laws rule of the jurisdiction of situs or of domicile. In countries reject-
ing the renvoi doctrine in general, this makes these situations exceptions 
to the rule of rejection. Any use of the conflict-of-laws rules of another 
jurisdiction has been defined,220 it will be remembered, as an application of 
the renvoi doctrine. Use of the renvoi doctrine with matters of property 
and of status makes for certainty,221 because, and only because, of the uni-
versal agreement upon the basic propositions stated, which are of the utmost 
practical importance, that matters of property are to be governed by the law 
of the situs, and matters of status by the law of the domicile. In the absence 
of such agreement, as we have seen in our consideration of renvoi and non-
the state of situs would determine it since that state alone must have the final 
authority. The cases on the point are in complete agreement." 
To the same effect as to real property: Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the 
Conflict of Laws-Meaning of "The Law of a Country," 27 Yale L.Jour. 509, 530, 
531 (1918), referring to "the permanent and exclusive physical control which a 
nation has over immovable property within its territories." Professor Lorenzen 
also says that "it would seem that in the conveyance of immovable property there 
is a reasonable basis for the e..--cpectation that the adoption of the renvoi doctrine 
would promote international uniformity of decision." Ibid. 531. 
Accord as to status, in part: Falcon bridge, Renvoi, Characterization and Ac-
quired Rights, 17 Can.Bar Rev. 369, .394 (1939). Professor Rheinstein feels that 
such a rule can not be stated so broadly as to status. Review of Harper & Taintor: 
Cases and Other Materials on Judicial Technique in Conflict of Laws, 8 Brooklyn L. 
Rev. 253, 256 (1938). In most foreign countries nationality rather than domicile 
controls status. 
216Jt must be remembered that even in most conflict-of-laws cases the forum is 
itself the situs or the domicile, so that the problem now being discussed does not 
arise. 
217In the case of personal property the time element enters in, that is, the forum 
applies the law of the situs at the time of the relevant occurrences. See also i1Jjra, 
§14. 
21BAs compared with those presented to the courts in the jurisdiction of situs 
or of domicile itself. Judgments in those cases will ordinarily be binding upon the 
forum, under full-faith-and-credit principles. 
219Apart from racial matters such a policy is almost, if not entirely, unknown. 
It is of course proper for the forum to regulate the condttct of foreign citizens, 
while within its borders, in accordance with its own ideas of fitness, regardless of 
their status. 
220At footnote #164. 
221Comment, Renvoi in Divorce Jurisdiction, 39 Harv.L.Rev. 640 (1926). 
See also infra, §14. With most foreign countries nationality must be substituted 
for domicile in connection with status. 
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renvoi possibilities in connection with contracts, there is no increase in cer-
tainty through adoption or rejection of the renvoi doctrine. 
·In this connection, it is important to remember carefully that, in coun-
tries in general rejecting the renvoi doctrine, the jurisdiction of situs or o£ 
domicile, where these matters of property or of status ordinarily arise, 
rejects the renvoi doctrine even as to them.222 Therefore, when the forum 
follows the renvoi doctrine to the extent of following the conflict-of-laws rule 
of the situs or of the domicile, there is involved only application of the 
domestic law of the jurisdiction selected by the situs or the domicile, without 
considering the conflict-of-laws rule of the jurisdiction thus looked to by the 
situs or the domicile. For this reason, in countries in general rejecting the 
renvoi doctrine, it may be helpful to think of these matters of property or of 
status as "limited" exceptions to the general rule of rejection. Or, more 
colloquially, it may be helpful to think of them as involving a "one-step" use 
of the renvoi, as only a single foreign conflict-of-laws rule will be made use 
of by the forum. 
It is believed that here again, as with the general American rule stated 
herein of rejection of the renvoi, the statements made are an accurate synthe-
sis of what the courts of such countries as the United States have been 
doing,223 should do, and will continue to do. Those who would like to con-
sider cases along this line are referred to Professor Griswold's able article, 
222In re Lando's Estate, 112 Minn. 257, 127 N.W. 1125, 30 L.R.A.[N.S.] 940 
(1910), is an exception to this rule. That was a "hard case'' involving a purported 
marriage, believed at least by the surviving woman to be valid, in Germany, be-
tween two young residents of Minnesota. The court stressed the presumption in 
favor of matrimony, so that it would not have to "brand the dead with betrayal 
and the living with dishonor." The court felt that "the considerations relied 
upon to repeal that presumption are not clear nor satisfactory, nor at all con-
clusive." Referring to German conflict-of-laws rules, which the court found dif-
ficult to understand, the final conclusion was "that the marriage in question, con-
forming as it did to the Minnesota law, conformed also to the German law." 
The renvoi doctrine was not referred to. The case is mentioned, Griswold, Renvoi 
Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1200, footnote # 123 (1938), and discussed: Bates, 
Remission and Transmission in American Conflict of Laws, 16 Corn.L.Quar. 311, 
316 (1931); Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws-Meaning of 
"The Law of a Country," 27 Yale L.Jour. 509, 510 (1918). In most foreign countries 
nationality rather than domicile controls statu·s. 
223Even Nevada nominally governs matters of status by the law of the bona 
fide domicile. According to a newspaper report, a lady was sentenced to two 
days in jail for contempt of court because she stated in her testimony that it was 
her intention to leave Nevada as soon as she had secured her divorce. Theu, pre-
sumably because of fear of frightening away future customers, the sentence was 
suspended. Whether the divorce was later granted was not stated. It has been held 
that in Arkansas residence instead of domicile is the jurisdictional basis for divorces, 
Squire v. Squire, 186 Ark. 511, 54 S.W.(2d) 281 (1932), but of course such divorces 
of persons domiciled elsewhere would not be recognized in other States. 
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Renvoi Revisited, in the Harvard Law Review.224 Nearly all the cases and 
situations referred to by him involve matters of property or of status.225 
Professor Griswold's conclusion is opposed to the synthesis here made. 
He feels that the cases where the forum has followed the conflict-of-laws 
rule of the situs or of the domicile indicate that the courts are in general 
adopting the renvoi doctrine, and that the "few cases which will not lend 
themselves to this approach can be handled if and when they 
arise."226 It-is believed that Professor Griswold has failed to appreciate the 
significance of the general agreement upon the basic principles that matters 
of property are to be governed by the law of the situs, and matters of status 
22451 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1194 et seq. (1938). In the following footnote are 
discussed certain cases referred to by him. For further discussion of cases, see: 
Bates, Remission and Transmission in American Conflict of Laws, 16 Corn.L.Quar. 
311 (1931); Schreiber, The Doctrine of the Renvoi in Anglo-American Law, 31 
Harv.L.Rev. 523, 565 (1918). 
22GThe exceptions are as follows : 
(1) Ratification of an unauthorized contract. This is "vezy tentatively ad-
vanced" as a situation where the renvoi might well be applied. Griswold, Renvoi 
Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1200 (1938). At the end of the discussion of this 
exception it is stated in a footnote: "The whole question of the application of the 
approach which looks to the 'whole law' of a state to the validity of contracts is 
tantalizing, but it is too complex for further discussion here." Ibid. footnote #126. 
(2) "Borrowing statutes," principally in regard to periods of limitation. Ibid. 
1188, 1202. Such a statute as to limitation provides that a cause of action is 
barred if barred where it arose, or at the defendant's place of residence, etc. 
In Holmes v. Hengen, 41 Misc. 521, 85 N.Y.S. 35 (1903), afid., 94 App.Div. 619, 88 
N.Y.S. 1104 (1904), and Ross v. Graham, 122 Misc. 574, 203 N.Y.S. 390 (1924), cited 
by Professor Griswold in this connection, ibid., 1188, footnote #75, 1202, footnote 
# 132, the forum, in order to find a definite period of limitation, under the forum's 
"borrowing statute," in the course of its search properly looked 'to the law of a 
third State. This was done because the statute of the jurisdiction originally looked 
to by the forum supplied the forum with no definite period of time. The problem 
was considered only from the standpoint of the letter of the various statutes. 
General periods of ·limitation are universally regarded, in this countzy, as matters 
of procedure, to be governed by the law of the forum. Restatement, Conflict of 
Laws (1934), §§603-604. It is a nice question whether general principles of con-
flict of laws are involved when the forum's general limitation statute, of the 
"borrowing" type, contains no definite figure, and in order to ascertain such it is 
necessazy to look to the statutes of other States. For a case where it was 
necessazy to do this in connection with a 11S1tr:y "borrowing statute," see Ellis v. 
Crowe, 193 Ark. 207, 99 S.W.(2d) 207 (1936). 
(3) Sufficiency of notice of dishonor to hold indorser. Griswold, ibid., 1204, 
footnote #140. Guernsey v. Imperial Bank of Canada, 188 Fed. 300, 301 (C.C.A. 
8th 1911), without referring to the renvoi doctrine, contains a dictum to' the effect 
that the forum should follow the conflict-of-laws rule of a foreign jurisdiction in 
which the indorsement was made. It may be observed that the modern tendency 
is to treat problems relating to negotiable instruments from a property standpoint. 
Bell v. Riggs, 34 Okla. 834, 127 Pac. 427 (1912), is over-generously cited by 
Professor Griswold as "somewhat to the contrazy." Ibid. See discussion of last 
mentioned case, Schreiber, The Doctrine of the Renvoi in Anglo-American Law, 
31 Harv.L.Rev. 523, 569 (1918). 
(4) Possibility of suit by a wife or a guest domiciled in one State against 
the husband or the host, because of an accident in another State. Ibid. 1205. No 
case is referred to in which the forum has applied the conflict-of-laws rule of 
another jurisdiction. 
(5) University of Chicago v. Dater, 277 Mich. 658, 270 N.W. 174 (1936), 
discussed herein, supra, footnote #212. 
226Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1182 (1938). 
266 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14 
by the law of the domicile. As will be seen, in the succeeding sections of 
this study,227 the significance of this was only partially grasped by the 
framers of the Restatement. Compared with the entire body of the law, 
matters of property and of status are only a small segment. Because as to 
them, by virtue of their special position, certainty is attained through a lim-
ited use of the renvoi, it does not follow that the courts should reverse their 
usual practice and adopt the renvoi doctrine in general, where no increase in 
certainty would be gained.228 
It may be asked whether there is not also agreement upon other basic 
principles of conflict of laws, justifying similar limited use of the renvoi in 
regard to them. The example which will probably occur to the reader's 
mind is the situation which has been discussed in connection with the "pre-
liminary question,"229 where a defendant acting in one jurisdiction has in-
flicted injury in another.230 There, however, the forum, assuming a differ-
ence of conflict-of-laws rules between it and the jurisdiction where the injury 
occurred,231 has no basic prepossession in favor of treating the matter from 
the standpoint of the defendant, who may have acted in good faith under a 
privilege or a duty existing by the law where he acted, or from the stand-
point of the injured plaintif£.232 If, as and when agreement either way 
arises, the situation is ready for addition to the list of exceptions to the rule 
of rejection of the renvoi. In order to qualify the situation for addition to 
the list of exceptions, however, it will also be necessary that differences of con-
flict-oi-laws rules still remain as to when or how far to look to the law of 
the place where the defendant acted, otherwise the problem will have ceased 
to e.'\:ist. It is a task for the judges and scholars of the future to bring about 
agreement upon all conflict-of-laws principles as far as possible. Law is an 
ever-developing social science, and the fact that future progress is to be 
anticipated does not detract from the validity and value of a synthesis based 
upon what has been already accomplished.233 
227§§10-13. With most foreign countries nationality must be substituted for 
domicile. 
228Professor Griswold does not contend for "just a change of emphasis," but 
for "a whole different approach." Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1183 
(1938). He excepts the "few cases where this step would lead to the insoluble 
difficulty of the endless chain." Ibid. It is believed that it has been sufficiently 
indicated in the text herein that the possibility of this exists in all situations except 
those of status and of property. See also, as to attaining certainty, infra, §14. 
Dean Falcon bridge has suggested that possibly the American States, because of 
their relative agreement upon conflict-of-laws principles, should be considered as a 
class by themselves, as opposed to all other countries. Renvoi, Characterization and 
Acquired Rights, 17 Can.Bar Rev. 369, 387 (1939). 
229At footnotes # #141-148. See also, as to certainty, infra, §14. 
230For illustrations suggested by Professor Griswold's article, Renvoi Revisited, 
51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165 (1938), see Sltpra, footnote #225. 
2310therwise the question can not arise. 
232As to the state of the law, see Sltpra, footnote #144. See also infra, §14. 
233Bartin, the great French scholar, groped for a synthesis such as that set 
forth herein. He said, in part: "The idea of re11voi . . . seems to me inde-
fensible on the limited ground of personal status. Its promoters would perhaps 
.. 
1941] CONFLICT OF LAWS 267 
b. (§10) Real Property 
The Restatement provides : 
"All questions of title to land are decided in accordance with the 
law of the state where the land is, including the Conflict of Laws 
rules of that state."234 
c. (§11) Personal Property 
Although not recognized in the Restatement as a general exception to 
the rule of rejection of the renvoi, upon principle the situation is the same in 
regard to personal property.235 
It is pointed out in the Restatement, apparently without realizing that a 
limited use of the renvoi is involved, that if a chattel mortgaged in one 
State is removed to another with the consent of the owner, and the chattel 
is there judicially sold : 
". . . The title of the purchaser at such sale will be recognized 
as valid against the mortgagee in any state, even the state in which 
the chattel was at the time of the mortgage."236 
As the judicial sale is based upon the conflict-of-laws rule of the second 
State, refusing to recognize the foreign mortgage, a use of the renvoi doctrine 
is involved when the title thus acquired is brought into question in a State 
other than that in which the sale occurred. Applicability of the "full faith 
and credit" provision does not change the principles involved. 
The following illustration given in connection with Section 278 of the 
be more successful if they made its application more general, extending it to a 
wider range of difficulties connected with a different conception, and including in it, 
if need be, the provisions as to personal status. • . . It is obviously from the 
quarter of the composition of the family and the regulation of succession or the 
regulation of property between spouses, that it is to be looked for." Battin, 
Principes de Droit International Prive selon la loi et la Jurisprudence Fran<;aises 
(Paris, 1930), section Le Caractere des Regles du Conflit des Lois, translated, 169 
Law Times 147, 143 (1930). See also infra, §14. 
234Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), §8(1). Assuming that "title to land" 
sufficiently describes all real property matters, .this adequately covers the use of 
the renvoi doctrine in that connection. It could well have been pointed out in the 
Restatement, along the line of the discussion in the text herein, that only a 
"limited" use of tl1e renvoi is involved. The illustrations given in the Restatement 
Comment accompanying the section are in harmony with this. 
235Falconbridge, Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights, 17 Can.Bar Rev. 
369, 392 (1939) ; Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1202 (1938) ; 
Hellendall, The Res in Transitu and Similar Problems in the Conflict of Laws, 
17 Can.Bar Rev. 7, 8 (1939). 
Dean Falconbridge has pointed out that, as personal property can be moved 
from one jurisdiction to another, there is not the same practical necessity for fol-
lowing the conflict-of-laws rule of the situs as in the case of real property (Contract 
and Conveyance in the Conflict of Laws, 81 Univ.Pa.L.Rev. 661, 682-683 [1934], and 
it is true that, in dealing 'vith personal property, the forum is more likely to be 
influenced by "reciprocity,'' or other narrow public policy of the forum, to discard 
its usual conflict-of-laws principles and apply the domestic law of the forum. 
All of this, as Dean Falconbridge would agree, does not detract from the validity 
of the principles set forth in the present study. 
236Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), §270, Comment (d). 
.. 
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Restatement is to the same effect, without' being complicated by any 11full 
faith and credit" feature : 
"A sells an automobile to B in state X, reserving title. This 
reservation of title is valid according to the law of X. With the 
consent of A, B takes the automobile to state Y and there sells it to 
C, a purchaser for value and without notice. According to the law 
of Y, title passes to C. C takes the automobile into state Z, the 
law of \vhich is the same as that of X. A brings action in state Z 
to recover the automobile. C's title, having been validly acquired 
in Y, is recognized as valid in Z." 
Foreign recognition of the conflict-of-laws rules of the situs is implied 
in connection with other sections of the Restatement setting forth rules in 
regard to acquisition of title to personal property in accordance with the 
conflict-of-laws principles of the situs.237 The rules stated would be largely 
rendered ineffective if the title acquired were to be recognized only so long 
as the chattel did not cross a state line. 
d. (§12) Status 
This is partially covered by the Restatement.238 Section 8(2) provides: 
"All questions concerning the validity of a decree of divorce are de-
cided in accordance with the law of the domicil" of the parties, in-
cluding the Conflict of Laws rules of that state."239 
The Comment upon Section 131 states: 
"If . . . a statute [prohibiting both parties to a divorce from 
remarrying] is by its provisions applicable to a marriage of a 
domiciliary in another state or if it is interpreted by the court as 
being so applicable, remarriage in another state by such a domi-
ciliary after a divorce in the state in which he was domiciled, will 
be invalid everywhere." 
Section 132 also recognizes the control of the jurisdiction of domicile 
over the conflict-of-laws rules governing marriages of its citizens. In addi-
tion to the text of the section, the Comment states : 
". . . If a marriage offends a strong policy of the domicil in 
any other respect [than those enumerated in the section], ·such 
marriage will be invalid everywhere." 
237For example, Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), §§269, 271 & 276-277. 
238The 1926 draft of Section 8 referred to "question of status," and the 1930 
draft to "existence of a marital status." See Falconbridge, Renvoi, Characterization 
and Acquired Rights, 17 Can.Bar Rev. 369, 393 (1939). Evidently basing his re-
mark upon the 1930 draft, Dean Falconbridge stated that in his opinion it went 
"further in the direction of recognizing the doctrine of the ren:voi than the English 
cases go or are likely to go." Contract and Conveyance in the Conflict of Laws, 
81 Univ.PaL.Rev. 661, 682 (1934). 
239Professor Lorenzen has pointed out that the modern Italian theory that law 
is primarily personal to the individual logically leads to the conclusion that fora 
should permit all conflict-of-laws rules relating to an individual to be selected 
by the law of his nationality. E. G. L[orenzen], Note, 29 Yale L.Jour. 214, 218 
(1919). This is in harmony with the Nazi-Fascist ideology of the superiority of 
their citizens. If in any case a "superior'' individual were adverse to an "inferior" 
one, presumably the views of the jurisdiction of nationality of the latter would be 
• ignored. 
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Courts and writers are likely to use "shorthand reasoning," and refer 
directly to the law of the place where a marriage is perfo:rmed, for example, 
without stating that it controls because such is the will of the jurisdiction of 
domicile.240 Professor Beale is very clear: 
"If . . . any state takes an exceptional view . . . and re-
fuses to attach a status to the valid contract of marriage (where 
most courts would give it effect), all courts should, in dealing with 
the marriage of domiciliaries of that state, decide the question as the 
courts of the domicil would decide it."241 
In dealing with status matters (or any others), a narrow public policy 
of the forum may cause it to depart from its usual conflict-of-laws rules, and 
apply the domestic law of the forum.242 Insofar as the forum is guided by 
such public policy, except in that sense it has no law of conflict of laws. If 
such public policy were to be applied to all matters, the forum would always 
apply its own domestic law. Therefore, decisions of that sort prove nothing 
as to conflict-of-laws principles when such principles are applied. 
e. (§13) Property Matter Treated as Though One of Status, 
or Vice Versa 
From the standpoint of the present discussion, this type of situation, as 
where personal property at death is governed by the law of the domicile 
of the decedent,243 is stti generis.244 By looking to the law of the domicile, 
the matter, though one of property,245 is treated as though it were one of 
status. It seems clear that if the forum is a third State, later required to 
pass upon the effect of death upon the title to the property,246 it will apply 
any relevant conflict-of-laws rule of the domicile, for example, that a will is 
240For e."'l:ample, Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), §§121 et seq. This point 
is made in Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1199 (1938). Problems 
of characterization arise in determining which portions of the law of status shall 
be referred by the domicile to other jurisdictions. Adoption involves jurisdictional 
problems. Dean Falconbridge erroneously distinguishes marriage law from that 
governing status. Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Law Quar.Rev. 235 
& 537, 564 (1937). 
2412 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), 697, §132.6. 
2422 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), 668, footnote #1, §121.2. 
243Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1185 (1938) ; Lorenzen, 
The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law, 10 Col.L.Rev. 190 & 327 
at 327 (1910). With most foreign countries nationality must be substituted for 
domicile. 
244Jn a country in general rejecting the renvoi. 
245That it is one of property is proved by the fact that the jurisdiction of situs 
may, and occasionally does, depart from the historic and usual rule that personal 
property at death is governed by the law of the domicile of the decedent. Cal. 
Prob.Code (1939), §40; 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), 58, §8.2; Griswold, Renvoi 
Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1195 (1938) (quoting statutes); 2 Page on Wills 
(2d ed. 1926), 2405, §1431. That the validity of this will be recognized by other 
jurisdictions is either stated or assumed by these writers. As to Russian refugees, 
sec Dobrin, The English Doctrine of the Renvoi and the Soviet Law of Succession, 
15 Brit.Y.B.Int.Law 36, 45 (1934); discussed, Griswold, ibid., 1196, footnote #105. 
246There may have been no probate proceedings in State B. The action of 
the forum would be the same if it were the situs, but that situation would not 
present the present problem. 
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valid if executed in accordance with the law of the place of execution.247 
This involves a seco11d use of foreign conflict-of-laws principles by the 
forum, as it has already followed the conflict-of-laws rule of the situs that 
the matter is to be governed by the law of the domicile.248 This second use 
is in conflict with the statement previously made,249 that the exceptions to the 
American rule of rejection of the renvoi involve only a single, or "one-
step," use of foreign conflict-of-laws principles by the forum. As there is 
here a second, or "two-step" use, this situation must be remembered as an 
exception to that statement.250 Ordinarily, in solving such a problem, this 
would not be noticed, as "shorthand reasoning" would be used, and the court 
of the forum would look directly to the law of the domicile. 
The reasoning applicable will be the same if a situation arises where a 
jurisdiction of domicile treats a matter of status as though it were one of 
property. 
C. (§14) Agreement Among Potentially Governing Jurisdictions 
In connection with characterization and localization,2G1 the suggestion 
has been made that if the forum feels that its own domestic law is not 
applicable, and if the jurisdictions whose domestic law the forum considers 
potentially applicable agree, the forum should yield to their view. The 
thought seems equally applicable here. It furthers the attainment of cer-
tainty in these cases, and avoids the gamble dependent upon the view held by 
the jurisdiction which happens to become the forum for litigation. For ex-
ample, if the forum, jurisdiction A, finds that in a case involving a contract 
executed in jurisdiction B and to be performed in jurisdiction C, B and C 
agree upon which system of law should be applied, the forum should follow 
that view, although contrary to its own. 
247Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Executed, §1. "Borrowing'' statutes are dis-
cussed in Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1201 (1938), and herein 
supra, footnote #225. A case has arisen involving the situation set forth in the 
text, except that the forum was also the situs. Baird's Estate, Orphan's Court of 
Philadelphia, July 18, 1916, unreported, but stated, Bates, Remission and Trans-
mission in American Conflict of Laws, 16 Corn.L.Quar. 311, 316 (1931) ; discussed, 
Griswold, ibid., 1191. 
248That such a conflict-of-laws rule is involved in the process, see footnote 
#245, supra. 
Griswold correctly points out that Beale and Cheshire are in error in holding 
that this is not a rule of conflict of laws. Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv. 
L.Rev. 1165, 1198 (1938). Abbot is also in error in concluding that because the law 
of the situs is supreme the law of the domicile is only evidentiary. Is the Renvoi 
a Part of the Common Law?, 24 Law Quar.Rev. 133, 141 (1908). 
24DSupra, between footnotes # #222 and 223. 
250There will be no possibility of a third, or "three-step," use of foreign con-
flict-oi-laws principles by the forum, because; as previously seen, supra, between 
footnotes # #222 and 223, the jurisdiction of domicile will reject the renvoi in 
regard to the problem, and not inquire into the conflict-of-laws rules of the juris-
diction whose domestic law has been selected by the domicile to govern. 
251S1tpra, at footnotes # #38 & 125. 
.. 
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4. UNDER RENVOI, HOW TO END SEARCH 
A. (§15) Own Domestic Law 
271 
We shall now consider how, when the forum, and all other jurisdictions 
involved in the situation, have the full renvoi doctrine, the forum brings 
to a successful conclusion its search for a domestic law to govern the 
problem before it. The key to our endeavor is the principle that under the 
renvoi the court follows the conflict-of-laws rule of the jurisdiction looked to. 
The forum, either originally, or upon a subsequent reference, may look 
to the law of a jurisdiction whose conflict-of-laws rule also is to apply its 
own domestic law, that is, the law of the foreign jurisdiction. The forum 
then applies that law to the problem.252 
B. Gap, or Desistement 
a. (§16) No Conflicts Rule 
What will the forum do, under the renvoi, if it is unable to ascertain 
the conflict-of-laws rule of the jurisdiction looked to? Such a situation is 
not all unlikely in this relatively unsettled field. It is the feeling of the 
present writer that the forum, probably using "shorthand reasoning," will 
apply a presumption that the jurisdiction looked to has the same conflict-
of-laws rule, that is, that the domestic law of such foreign jurisdiction is to 
govern. If so, the result, as in the preceding section, is that the forum 
will apply that law to the problem. The adoption of such a presumption 
seems to be an easy and natural way to dispose of the problem, and one 
as likely as any other to reach good practical results.253 
b. (§17) No Domestic Law 
If the forum desires to apply the domestic law of a foreign jurisdic-
tion, but is unable to ascertain what it is/54 the rule is well settled that 
the forum will apply its own domestic law.255 This is another aspect of 
the "gap," or "desistement,"2~6 doctrine. The theory is that the forum's 
252Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1190 (1938). In various 
connections reference has been made, at footnotes # #38, 125 & 251, to the possi-
bility that the forum may feel that its own domestic law is not applicable, but may 
find th'!t the jurisdictions considered potentially applicable agree upon a view contra 
to that of the forum as to which should control. If such a situation develops in 
connection with choice of conflict-of-laws rules, when the forum is following the 
renvoi doctrine, the search leads to a jurisdiction which applies its own domestic 
law, in line with the discussion herewith in the text. 
253No reference to this problem has been found. , 
254!£ the forum and the foreign jurisdiction are both coml)lon-law jurisdictions 
(or both civil law), the forum may "ascertain" the foreign law through the 
application of a presumption, in the absence of proof. 
255This rule is also applied when the forum is rejecting the renvoi doctrine. 
It does not detract from the validity of the principle of rejection. See the pre-
ceding footnote, and also, sztpra, at footnote #185. 
256As previously indicated, this term is also used to refer to an argument 
in favor of the renvoi doctrine in general, that if for any reason the jurisdiction 
looked to by the forum docs not claim that the law of such foreign jurisdiction 
is applicable to the case, 1here is an absence of any law to govern the situation, 
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domestic law is the best that is available, in the judgment of the forum, 
with which to fill the hiatus in the law of the foreign jurisdiction. The 
absence of a conflict-of-laws rule, considered in the preceding section, also 
involves a gap, or hiatus, in the law, but the desistement doctrine seems 
to have been thought of only in connection with the absence of a domestic 
law, and it is believed that only here will it be applied. 
C. Finding a Circle 
a. (§18) Completing a Circle 
If a jurisdiction looked to, either originally or upon a subsequent 
reference, refers the matter back to the law of the forum, or to that of any 
other jurisdiction which has already been looked to in the search for a 
governing law, a literal renvoi is had. This is the type of situation, it will 
be recalled,257 which first directed attention to the problem, now subdivided 
into the four problems discussed in this paper, whether the forum should 
follow its own choice of a conflict-of-laws rule. 
In this situation, as already indicated,258 the forum "accepts the renvoi," 
that is, the domestic law of the jurisdiction looked to a second time is 
. applied. This affords a way out of the logical dilemma of perpetual refer-
ence back and forth.259 When the forum thus deals with such a situation, 
it may be said that the forum desists from further efforts in the search 
for a governing law when it lias found, or completed, a circle.200 
b. (§19) Circle and a Half 
A variation of the "circle" solution has ·.been developed, in situations 
where the jurisdiction originally looked to by the forum immediately refers 
the matter back of the law of the forum.261 Here it has been reasoned: 
that the forum is endeavoring to do as a court of the foreign jurisdiction 
would; that a court of the foreign jurisdiction would "accept a reference" 
back to its law from that of the forum; and that, therefore, the forum should 
in which event the forum fills the hiatus by applying its own domestic law. See 
supra, at footnote #184. 
257Supra, at footnote #157. 
258SttPra, at footnote #158. 
259SuPra, at footnote #161. 
260Qr, more eruditely, a circflltts inextricabilis. Breslauer, Private International 
Law of Succession (1937), 16; Falconbridge, Renvoi, Characterization and Ac-
quired Rights, 17 · Can.Bar Rev. 369, 380 (1939) ; Morris, The Law of the 
Domicile, 18 Brit.Y.B.Int.Law 32, 33 (193~). 
261Jt will be developed in the text that it is believed that the variation is 
fallacious. All decisions and discussions relating to the variation which have been 
found have involved the situation of an immediate reference back to the law of 
the forum from that of the 'jurisdiction originally looked to, and the discussion in 
the text herein will deal only with this situation. However, no reason is dis-
cernible why the same fallacy may not appear in connection with any other sort 
of reference of the problem back to the law of a jurisdiction which has previously 
been looked to. Such a possibility involves only different mechanical application of 
the reasoning for and against the variation which will be set forth in the text, 
and does not warrant further exploration. 
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do likewise, and apply the domestic law of the foreign jurisdiction.262 
The result reached is thus the same as though the forum had rejected the 
renvoi doctrine. This method of achieving that result has been termed 
a "double renvoi ;"263 or it may be said that the forum has completed a 
"circle and a half." 
The reasoning upon which the "circle and a half" solution is based 
seems illogical. To decide the case as a court of the foreign jurisdiction 
would, the forum should consider what that court would do if it were 
substituted as the forum. In the "circle and a half" reasoning it has 
been overlooked that this is not being done. If the conception of "accepting 
the reference," upon which the "circle and a half" reasoning is based, is 
sound, it would seem logical to accept the reference as soon as a circle 
situation is encountered. If the foreign court, substituted as the forum, 
were to do so, it would accept the original reference back to itself, . and 
apply its own domestic law, and not that of a foreign jurisdiction, as the 
forum is doing under the "circle and a half" reasoning.264 
262Breslauer, Private International Law of Succession (1937), 16; Cheshire, 
Private International Law (2d ed. 1938), 61; Falconbridge, Renvoi, Characterization 
and Acquired Rights, 17 Can.Bar Rev. 369, 381 (1939) ; Morris, The Law of the 
Domicile, 18 Brit. Y.B.Int.Law 32, 34 (1937) ; Robertson, Characterization in the 
Conflict of Laws (1940), 135. 
In In re Annesley, [1926] 1 Ch. 692, 708, Mr. Justice Russell, who preferred 
for himself to reach the same result through rejecting the renvoi, said: " 
I have come to the conclusion that I ought to accept the view that according to 
French law the French courts, in administering the movable property of a deceased 
foreigner who according to ·the law of his country, is domiciled in France, and 
whose property must, according to that law, be applied in accordance with the law 
of the country in which he was domiciled, will [accept the renvoi and] apply French 
municipal law, and that even though the deceased had not complied with art. 13 
of the Code [permitting acquisition of a domicile in France]. The result is that 
[applying French domestic law] as regards her English personal estate and her 
French property the [English] testatrix in this case had power only to dispose of 
one-third thereof by her will." 
In In re Tallml!dge, 109 Misc. 696, 181 N.Y. 336, 344 (1919), Mr. Referee 
Winthrop, who concluded that the renvoi is not part of the law of New York, 
said: "A possible alternative is the application of French internal law on the 
second reference. For, if a New York court, in attempting to apply French principles 
governing the conflict of laws, must regard itself as a French court, a view that 
has been urged by many of the courts indorsing 'renvoi,' it should apply the law 
as a French court would apply it. But the French court would look to the national 
law (the law of New York), and then accept the reference back to France-in 
other words would apply the law of France-so that the New York court, sitting 
as a French court, would apply the French law; the result being the same as if 
there were no 'renvoi' at all, in other words, as if the New York court applied 
French territorial law in the first instance under its own view of the conflict 
of law." See also Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign 
Law, 10 Col.L.Rev. 190, 199, 206 and footnote #52 (1910), referred to by the 
learned referee. 
263Breslauer, Private International Law of Succession (1937), 17; Falconbridge, 
Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights, 17 Can.Bar Rev. 369, 381, footnote 
#34 (1939); Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), 135. 
264Criticizing the "circle and a half" reasoning: Cheshire, Private Inter-
national Law (2d ed. 1938), 61 ; Morris, The Law of the Domicile, 18 Brit.Y.B.Int. 
Law 32, 34 (1937). Professor Beale does not include it as a practical possibility. 
1 Conflict of Laws (1935), 56, §7.3. 
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In dealing with matters relating to foreign property, or to the status 
of those domiciled elsewhere, certainly can be attained, under the renvoi, 
through the use of "circle and a half" reasoning. This is because of the 
agreement upon basic conflict-of-laws principles in regard to these subjects 
which, as has been seen, enables the American States to achieve certainty as 
to them through the American "limited" use of the renvoi.20° For this 
practical reason "circle and a half" reasoning should be used, under the 
renvoi, in dealing with these matters. Apart from these matters certainty is 
neither gained nor lost through adoption or rejection of such reasoning. 
5. (§20) Combination of Jurisdictions Adopting and Rejecting Renvoi 
Here again the key to the solution is that adoption or rejection of the 
renvoi doctrine by the forum determines whether or not it acts in ac-
cordance with the conflict-of-laws rules of other jurisdictions.200 If the 
forum rejects the renvoi, it is immaterial whether the jurisdiction looked to 
by the forum does so or not, as the forum will not inquire into the 
conflict-of-laws views of the foreign jurisdiction. 
Professor Griswold, however, favors application of the renvoi doctrine in this 
form. He says: "There is . . . a fourth method of approach, which . . • 
was the earliest of all to appear in the English cases. The English judge in our 
case is referred by his conflict of laws rule to the law of France. Wltat is the law 
of France? According to this view it is the law which a French court would apply 
to this very case. If a French court would apply French 'internal law' (either 
because it 'accepts the reuvoi' [italics inserted] or for any other reason), then the 
English court should apply French internal law." Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 
Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1168 (1938). He later concludes: "The conclusion is • • • 
that common-law courts should adopt the fourth view outlined at the beginning of 
this article and should abandon it only if it is clear that it does not lead to a 
definite and satisfactory disposition qf the particular case." Ibid. 1182. See also 
ibid. 1190-1191. 
As it is the practice under the renvoi doctrine to "accept the renvoi", Pro-
fessor Griswold's advocacy of the doctrine, as applied to a situation involving a 
"circle" among jurisdictions all applying the full renvoi to the problem, seems almost 
entirely academic. Assuming that the jurisdiction looked to by the forum "accepts 
the renvoi," Professor Griswold has the forum apply the domestic law of the 
foreign jurisdiction, which would have been the result if the forum had rejected the 
renvoi doctrine. The only possible exception to this would be a most extraordinary 
case, where a jurisdiction looked to in the course of the search for a governing law 
refers the matter back to the law of a jurisdiction which has previously been looked 
to, and which is neither the forum nor the jurisdiction originally looked to by the 
forum. See footnote #261, supra. 
205Supra, at footnote #221. With most foreign countries nationality must be 
substituted for domicile. 
260Except in dealing with foreign property, or the status of one domiciled out-
side the forum, the forum applying the renvoi doctrine should avoid "circle and a 
half" reasoning. See the preceding section. 
Breslauer makes the novel suggestion that the international disagreement as 
to adoption or rejection of the renvoi doctrine is, as a practical matter, beneficial: 
"It helps to avoid the insoluble difficulties which would obviously arise if two or 
all of them should accept either the unqualified theory of renvoi, including 'double-
renvoi,' or the English doctrine. On the other hand it diminishes the number of 
cases in which courts will apply a foreign law which would consider itself inapplic-
able-a necessary consequence of the adoption of the American view." Breslauer, 
Private International Law of Succession (1937), 17. See also ibid. 41. 
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If the forum follows the renvoi doctrine, it will complete the search 
for a governing law in accordance with that view, unless, in the course 
of the search, it is caused to look to the law of a jurisdiction which rejects 
the renvoi, in which event the search will be concluded upon that basis,267 
and the conflict-of-laws rules of any further jurisdiction will be immaterial. 
If the forum is following the renvoi, it may be said that the search for a 
governing law is worked out upon a renvoi basis until the renvoi chain 
is broken by looking to the law of a jurisdiction \Vhich rejects that doctrine. 
267Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1190 et seq. (1938). 
